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Kehittyvien markkinoiden yritykset ovat laajentaneet yritysostoja 1990-luvun loppupuoliskolta 
lähtien. Tämä työn inspiraatio ja perusta on aikaisempien tutkimusten ja journal-tason artikkelei-
den johtopäätöksissä ja työssä lähden tarkastelemaan yritysostoja tehneiden yritysten markkina-
arvojen muutosta ostoilmoituksesta eteenpäin. Yritykset on rajattu ns. BRICS-maihin (Brasilia, 
Venäjä, Intia, Kiina ja Etelä-Afrikka). Tutkimuksen tavoitteena on selvittää onko rajat ylittävistä 
yritysostoista hyötyä markkina-arvossa mitattuna ja mitkä ovat siihen vaikuttavat tekijät. 
 
Tutkimuksen lähdemateriaalina on BRICS-maista suoritetut yritysostot vuoden 1995 alusta vuo-
den 2014 loppuun. Tiedot ovat peräisin Thomson Financial Securities Data Company:n ja Thom-
son One tietokannoista. Materiaalissa on julkisesti noteerattujen yritysten ilmoittamat yritysostot, 
edellyttäen että ostajan osakehinnan tiedot ovat riittävästi saatavilla. Otoksen koko rajautuu e.m. 
kriteereillä 958 tapahtumaan.  
 
Empiirisessä testissä metodeina ovat tapahtuma-analyysi (event study) ja poikkileikkaus regres-
sio (cross-sectional regression). Tapahtuma-analyysissä tarkastelen kumulatiivista epänormaalia 
tuottoa seuraavilla tapahtuma-ajoilla: (-1, +1), (-3, +3) ja (-5, +5). Regressiossa on 14 eri muuttu-
jaa, joiden pohjalta käytettävissä oleva otos on 535 yritysostoa. 
 
Tapahtuma-analyysin perusteella kehittyvien markkinoiden ostajat saavat huomattavan positii-
visen hyödyn kun tapahtuma-aika on 3 päivää, ostettu yritys on kehittyneeltä markkinalta ja osta-
jalla ei ole valtio-taustaista omistusta. Luonnonvara-sektorilla tulokset eivät ole yhtä selviä: osak-
keiden arvossa mitattavat tuotto on tällä sektorilla merkittävää pidemmällä aikavälillä, 7 ja 11 päi-
vällä, kun taas muilla aloilla merkittävä muutos positiivinen muutos on havaittavissa 3 päivän ai-
kavälillä. 
 
Regressio-analyysin perusteella oston suhteellinen koko vaikuttaa merkittävän positiivisesti 
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11. Introduction
1.1. Background and motivation
As one of the major methods used by companies to achieve international expansion,
cross-border acquisitions have been widely studied. Extensive amount of papers have been
written on the subject of analysing the impact of this activity to both the acquiring company
and the target company, as well as the underlying reason for such impact. However, most of
the studies have been focusing on the acquisitions conducted by developed market acquirers. It
was not until the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s when the world started to witness
a fast growing trend of both the number of deals and the deal size in cross-border acquisitions
conducted by emerging market acquirers.
Compared to the developed market, emerging market originated acquisitions have their own
characteristics and face different challenges. This new group of acquisitions have attracted
attention from academia as well, more and more studies have been carried out to test various
streams of hypotheses in an effort to explain the reasons and influence of the phenomenon.
Majority of the existing studies focus on one specific emerging market, among the group,
Chinese and Indian markets are getting the highest attention due to their market sizes and
relatively high frequency of cross-border acquisition deals. Gubbi et al. (2010) study 425
cross-border acquisitions conducted by Indian companies from 2000 to 2007 and find significant
positive abnormal returns. Ning et al. (2014) use 335 deals by Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed
Chinese acquirers between 1991 and 2010 and show positive stock price reaction on average.
There are limited amount of articles that provide a wider view of emerging markets and they
give contradictory results. Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border deals mainly from
Asian countries between 1991 and 2004, and show value destruction in over half of the sample.
Bhagat et al. (2011) test 698 acquisitions made by emerging market companies between 1991
and 2008 and find significant positive market response on the announcement day.
Due to such lack of evidence from multi-country studies, this thesis is designed with the
intention to expand the existing limited findings and study the emerging market acquirers at an
overall level.
2This study employs sample data from five major emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries), which represent a significant part of the
emerging market. They also show a great variety of cultural and geographical diversity.
Therefore, they are very representative of the overall emerging market. The data is retrieved
from Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) and Thomson One systems, covering
cross-border acquisitions during the time period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2014.
Using various selection criteria, a full sample of 958 deals is obtained. The event study
methodology and cross-sectional regression analysis are used in the empirical tests to answer a
list of research questions regarding the parameters and predictors that can influence the acquirer
return. The event study is carried out using cumulative abnormal returns from three sets of event
windows: 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1), 7-day event window CAR(–3, +3), and 11-day
event window CAR(–5, +5). For the cross-sectional regression analysis, a list of variables are
introduced, which leads to a reduced subsample of 535 deals.
1.2. Research question
The main research goal of this thesis is to find out whether emerging market companies
benefit from cross-border acquisitions in the form of stock return and what are the factors that
can influence such return.
The synergy hypothesis (Bradley et al., 1988; Seth, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1993) proposes
that the value of the combined company will exceed the sum of the values of the individual
companies. In addition, bootstrapping hypothesis (Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Martynova and
Renneboog, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2011) suggest that the higher corporate governance standards
of the target company is seen as an advantage. Combining these two theories, the first research
question is introduced:
Do emerging market acquirers enjoy higher return when they purchase target companies
from developed countries?
A second research question is formulated based on government ownership. Government
ownership involvement in the acquiring firm poses various risks, such as principal-principal
conflict, principal-agent conflict (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Ning et al., 2014). These
3conflicts deteriorate investor’s confidence in the company, which further affects their investment
decisions. Deng and Yang (2015) argue that there is a strong presence of government ownership
in those companies actively seeking natural resources. Therefore, these two characteristics are
expected to have similar impact on acquirer return. Hence, the next research question:
Do government ownership involvement and natural resources relatedness deteriorate
emerging market acquirers’ return?
In addition, analysis is done on a list of predictors that might have some influence on the
acquirer return to find out those that have significant correlations.
1.3. Main findings
The event study results shows that, emerging market acquirers enjoys significant positive
returns during 3-day event window when the target companies are from developed markets.
This result is consistent with the findings from Gubbi et al. (2010). In addition, emerging market
acquirers experience significant positive returns during 3-day event window when the acquirers
themselves don’t have government ownership involvement, which is in line with the results from
Chen and Young (2010). Prior studies also suggest that there is a strong presence of government
ownership in natural resources related industries (Deng and Yang, 2015), thus, it is expected that
acquirers of non natural resources related deals benefit from positive return. However, natural
resources relatedness gives mixed results: emerging market acquirers of non natural resources
related deals enjoy significant positive returns from 3-day event window (observed from both
full sample and subsample), while acquirers of natural resources related deals enjoy significant
positive returns from 7-day and 11-day event windows (observed from full sample only). There
is a lack of similar finding from prior studies, except that an earlier study by Nicholson and
Salaber (2013) show that Chinese manufacturing companies benefit from positive returns when
announcing natural resources related acquisitions.
Cross-sectional analysis is performed on the subsample of 535 cross-border acquisitions 14
variables. The dependent variable used is the cumulative abnormal return from 3-day event
window CAR(–1, +1). The results from cross-sectional regression analysis show varying
correlations between different variables and acquirer return, however, only one of them has
4statistical significance: relative deal size. Obtained through calculating the ratio of the
acquisition transaction value to the acquirer’s market capitalization, relative deal size positively
influences the acquirer return. This result is consistent with the earlier study by Bhagat et al.
(2011).
1.4. Contributions and limitations
This thesis provides some insight to the acquiring companies’ stock performance at the
cross-border acquisition announcements by emerging market acquirers. It contributes to the
existing literature in such way that it provides an overall picture on the biggest emerging markets
using a multi-country data sample instead of one single market. Two major parameters used
in this thesis: government ownership involvement in the acquirer and the natural resources
related acquisitions, have not been widely used in multi-country data analysis. Therefore,
the multi-country results based on these parameters provide additional knowledge regarding
emerging market acquirers’ returns in general.
The results of this thesis also suffer from some limitations. The country selection of Brazil,
Russia, India, China, and South Africa means that there are country specific characteristics
which can impact the results. Some variables can have contradictory effects on deals from
different countries, which means that the overall multi-country analysis results can be biased.
In addition, the distribution of cross-border acquisitions are not even among the five selected
countries, that is, the higher proportion one country has, the higher the influence of that one
country to the final result. A possible solution to overcome these limitations is a comparative
study. A high level comparative study of the five countries are performed and the results are
discussed. Due to the lack of sample data from a few countries, however, it is not possible to
carry out a more comprehensive comparison in this thesis.
1.5. Structure
This paper is divided into the following sections. Firstly, the literature review examines the
analysis done by prior studies and sums up the key findings. Based on the literature review,
the hypotheses used in this study is introduced and the rationale behind hypotheses selection
5is explained. Following the literature review and hypotheses is the section on the sample
data, including its selection, collection process, and the description of the data. Methodology
section details the two methods used in the empirical tests: the event study method, and the
cross-sectional analysis. The results from empirical tests are demonstrated and discussed in the
results section. And finally the conclusion section wraps up this study.
62. Literature review and hypotheses
In this section, a series of existing literature in the field of cross-border acquisition study
is reviewed. The main theories, perspectives, and hypotheses are summarized to provide an
overview of the subject.
2.1. Cross-border acquisitions in general
Mergers and acquisitions, hereafter referred to as M&As, have been one of the most
import corporate strategies and one of the most heavily studied corporate finance topics. Most
traditionally, M&As involve two companies within the same country. While domestic M&As
still account for majority of the total M&A deals, growing amount of deals are happening
between two companies from two different countries, especially since the fifth merger wave
that covers the period of 1993 to 2000 (Hitt et al., 2001). Although sharing a lot of similarities
with domestic deals, cross-border acquisition1 has a set of different characteristics due to the
distinctive challenges it faces.
According to Shimizu et al. (2004), cross-border acquisitions are mainly used as:
• A mode of entry;
• A dynamic learning process;
• A value creating (or destroying) strategy.
Along with greenfield and joint venture, acquisition is one of the major equity-based mode
of entry, which provides the acquiring firm instant access to new markets (Shimizu et al., 2004).
Compared to other entry modes, cross-border acquisition offers clear advantage of instant access
to already established foreign resources, such as research and development (R&D) capabilities,
1While legally speaking, merger activities differ slightly from acquisition activities: merger refers to
consolidation of two companies into one new company; acquisition refers to the purchase of one company’s share
by another without an establishment of a new company. From the economic outcome point of view, the boundary
between the two activities are becoming more and more blurred. In fact, nowadays a lot of studies use either
merger or acquisition to refer to the previously known term M&A. In this paper, the term acquisition is used to
generalize a deal when one company seeks a percentage of another company’s ownership.
7instead of suffering through the time-consuming process of internal growth (Vermeulen and
Barkema, 2001; Belderbos, 2003; Deng, 2007). In addition, cross-border acquisition also
provides control over foreign asset, which in turn has a bearing on the firm value. Barbopoulos
et al. (2014) show in their study that acquisition of foreign assets, especially tangible ones, has
significant positive effect on the shareholder wealth.
As a dynamic learning process, various aspects and processes of cross-border acquisitions
are covered, for instance, pre-acquisition due diligence and negotiation, and post-acquisition
integration (Shimizu et al., 2004). Knowledge and experience learned from a cross-border
acquisition can affect a company’s performances in future cross-border acquisitions, as Hitt
et al. (1998) present in their study that learning will improve the chance of future success.
The best learning experience, Hayward (2002) argues, is obtained through acquisitions that are
neither highly similar nor highly different to the acquisition of focus.
Cross-border acquisitions as a value creating strategy is one of the most popular topics in the
finance field. Numerous researches from both theoretical and empirical perspectives have been
conducted in order to analyze the impact on firm value and uncover the cause of value creation
or value destruction in the cross-border acquisition activities. Three major hypotheses have
been established during the research process: managerialism hypothesis, hubris hypothesis, and
synergy hypothesis (Seth et al., 2002).
Managerialism hypothesis focuses on the conflict of interest between company managers
and shareholders. Baumol (1962) argue that shareholder value of companies with a managerial
set up will suffer in such way that shareholder’s interest becomes the expense of managers’
pursuance of sales or growth maximization. Seth et al. (2000, 2002) suggest, in the context of
managerialism hypothesis, the managers will knowingly overpay for the acquisition to satisfy
their own needs: empire building and risk reduction, all of this is done while sacrificing
shareholder’s benefits.
Denis et al. (2002) further explain the underlying causes of such managerial behavior. First
of all, managing a multinational firms bestows power and prestige on the manager. Secondly,
in most cases, managerial compensation is positively correlated to the size of the firm. Thirdly,
the risk of manager’s undiversified personal portfolio is reduced through global diversification.
As a result, managers have strong motivation to pursue value reducing strategy for the firm.
8Add on top of that, monitoring managerial behavior and decision making in a complex globally
diversified firm can be very difficult.
The hubris hypothesis (Roll, 1986), on the other hand, suggests that the acquisition premium
reflects nothing but a random error due to the manager’s mistake in the target company
evaluation, that is, overpaying for the target. Roll (1986) argues that the hubris hypothesis
is consistent with strong-form market efficiency, which assumes asset prices reflect fully all
the relevant information. According to hubris hypothesis, the combined value of the acquirer
and target should fall slightly, and the amount of value decrease reflects the acquisition cost.
Although perfect market efficiency is unlikely, Roll (1986) suggests the concept being used as
a benchmark of comparison against other hypothesis.
Seth et al. (2000) further test the hubris hypothesis and refine it as such that acquisitions
will generate zero total gain due to the adverse effect on the shareholder wealth of the acquiring
company and the target company: one declines while the other one increases respectively.
The synergy hypothesis (Bradley et al., 1988; Seth, 1990; Kogut and Zander, 1993) proposes
that the value of the combined company will exceed the sum of the values of the individual
companies. Or simply put: 1+ 1 > 2. According to Seth (1990); Seth et al. (2000, 2002), the
sources of the excess gain from cross-border acquisition are:
• the potential to transfer valuable intangible assets between the acquirer and the target;
• new valuable production-investments opportunities for the combined company that come
with skills and resources acquired from the target company, which leads to the increased
value of the acquirer in its home country;
• newmarket development opportunities by overcoming limited or restricted market growth
in home country;
• reduced systematic risk and total risk as a result of the increased level of financial market
integration.
In addition, Denis et al. (2002) suggest that the synergy from global diversification can be
the result of:
9• extended market for information-based assets;
• increased flexibility within the firm to respond to various institutional differences, such
as prices, tax codes etc.;
• reduced cost on international diversification compared to individuals, which leads to
investor’s willingness to pay a premium for globally diversified firms.
In reality, there can be multiple presence of the managerialism, hubris, and synergy
hypothesis, as shown in the studies by Seth et al. (2000, 2002). Overall though, the synergy
hypothesis has been a dominant one in explaining the value creation in the cross-border
acquisitions.
Empirical studies on short-term returns during announcement window have shown mixed
results. Some researches show that cross-border acquisitions generate significant positive
returns to the acquirer (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Eun et al., 1996; Seth et al., 2002; Chari
et al., 2009; Barbopoulos et al., 2014). As an example, Seth et al. (2000) present the result
that post-acquisition combined company enjoys an average increase in value of as much as
7.5 percentage comparing to the pre-acquisition individual companies. On the contrary, Denis
et al. (2002); Kuipers et al. (2009) find negative result on acquirer returns in international
acquisitions. There are also results that shows inconclusiveness. Dos Santos et al. (2008)
suggest that there is a lack of evidence on the correlation of cross-border acquisition and value
destruction, however, they find significant diversification discount, a striking 24 percent, in
their industrial diversification subsample. While comparing domestic and cross-border deals
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) find significant lower acquirer returns in the US originated
cross-border acquisitions relative to the domestic acquisitions.
2.2. Emerging market acquirers
Though the advanced economies, or in other words the developed countries, have been the
ones from which majority of the cross-border acquisitions are initiated, the emerging markets
are catching up at a great speed. Late 1990s and early 2000s saw the beginning of a fast
growing trend in the cross-border acquisition activities by emerging market acquirers. Due to
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their distinctive economic characteristics, emerging market acquirers quite often exhibit unique
attributes during the cross-border acquisition activities.
There are various theories and perspectives regarding the motivations for
internationalization by emerging market firms. Deng (2004) presents that emerging market
firms generally demonstrate five motivations when engaging in international investments:
market-seeking motivation, risk diversification-seeking motivation, resource-seeking
motivation, technology-seeking motivation, and strategic asset-seeking motivation.
Resource-seeking in this case mainly refers to natural resources. Some other studies
categorize natural resource and technology into the strategic asset class (Peng et al., 2008;
Wu and Xie, 2010; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). From here on, strategic asset is used as a
category covering natural resource, technology related assets, and other strategic assets.
Market-seeking motivation is very similar to the method mentioned earlier in which foreign
acquisition is used as a market entry mode. It provides the acquirer the quick access to
already established external market as well as the control over internal strategic resources. Such
market-seeking motivation is mainly driven by either competitiveness in the domestic market
(Wu and Xie, 2010), or the limitation of effective demand locally (Deng, 2004). By expanding
into new geographic locations, the acquirer eliminates the constraints associated with current
market and its existing players (Deng and Yang, 2015). Deng (2007) also suggest that foreign
acquisitions can be used to help acquirers establish their image through brand names of target
companies. Several studies have shown that cross-border acquisition is the fastest means for
emerging market companies to expand internationally (Belderbos, 2003; Deng, 2007, 2009).
Risk diversification is another important driver for overseas investments. As Denis et al.
(2002) point out, internationalization activity can improve flexibility towards price fluctuation
and better equip the acquirer with more means to quickly respond to such risks. In his
study on Chinese market, Deng (2004) argues risk diversification motive is mainly pursued
by state-owned trading companies, which also benefit from the government’s encouragement,
both financially and politically. Government ownership has a strong presence in some of the
emerging markets, and poses unique challenges as well as conflicts in the decision-making and
value creating process, this will be discussed in details later.
Many researches suggest strong presence of strategic asset seeking motivation in the
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cross-border acquisitions by emerging market acquirers, for example, the pursuance of natural
resources by Chinese acquirers (Deng, 2004, 2007, 2009; Rui and Yip, 2008), and the highly
frequent activities by Indian companies in the technology related industry (Sun et al., 2012).
The intangible resources and innovation based knowledge, such as R&D, are gaining more
attention as well (Luo and Tung, 2007). Deng (2004) argues that such strategic asset seeking
driven activity serves the purpose of maximizing company’s overall performance and increasing
the competency.
Another import theory is from the strategic management point of view, which includes three
leading perspectives:
• the industry-based view (Porter, 1980);
• the resource-based view (Barney, 1991);
• the institution-based view (Peng et al., 2009, 2008).
In a more recent study, Sun et al. (2012) use this strategy tripod as one main basis for their
analysis on emerging market companies’ outward acquisitions. The three strategic views are
summarized and explained as the following:
The industry-based view suggests that developed market companies usually have controlling
power over high-end value-added activities, while emerging market companies dominant in
low-end value-added activities, such as low labor cost for manufacturing process. Hence, as
part of their development needs, emerging market companies use foreign acquisitions to update
their low-end value-added activities.
The resource-based view contains two perspectives: the springboard perspective, and the
catch-up and learning perspective. Luo and Tung (2007) introduce the springboard perspective
to explain the internationalization process of emerging market firms. According to their
springboard theory, emerging market firms engage in internationalization activities to acquire
critical resources in order to compete more effectively against international rivals both in their
home market and in new global markets, and to overcome their latecomer disadvantages in
foreign markets. The catch-up and learning perspective is closely associated with the argument
presented by Shimizu et al. (2004), that the acquirer uses the cross-border acquisition as a
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learning process to improve their future success.
The institution-based view suggests that the cross-border acquisition activities are either
encouraged or discouraged by domestic institutions and trade liberalization, such as the
government policy at both political and financial level regarding foreign investments.
Despite of various theories and perspectives, at the core lies the question of whether such
acquisition activities would create value to the firm, or destroy value. The general value creating
hypotheses of cross-border acquisitions: hubris, managerialism, and synergy, are broadly used
in the analysis of acquisitions initiated by emerging market acquirers. These three hypotheses
remain very much the same for the emerging market acquirers with some additional aspects. In
addition to the previously discussed characteristics of the managerialism hypothesis, it also
contains further implication of pride in the emerging market acquirer context. Hope et al.
(2011) find evidence suggesting a higher premium is knowingly being paid when the transaction
displays national pride.
One additional hypothesis frequently associated with emerging market acquirers is the
bootstrapping hypothesis. According to bootstrapping hypothesis, the higher corporate
governance standards of the target company is seen as an advantage and the acquirer will
voluntarily bootstrap itself to such target. As a result, positive return is enjoyed by the acquirer
(Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Bhagat et al., 2011).
A series of empirical studies have been conducted to test whether emerging market acquirers
experience positive returns around the announcement window. The results from these studies
are mixed. Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border deals mainly from Asian
countries between 1991 and 2004, and show value destruction in over half of the sample.
Bhagat et al. (2011) test 698 acquisitions made by emerging market companies between 1991
and 2008 and find significant positive market response on the announcement day. There are
also studies concentrated on individual market. Gubbi et al. (2010) study 425 cross-border
acquisitions conducted by Indian companies from 2000 to 2007 and find significant positive
abnormal returns, especially when the target is from developed economy. Ning et al. (2014) use
335 deals by Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed Chinese acquirers between 1991 and 2010 and
show positive stock price reaction on average.
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2.3. On measuring acquirer return
Various empirical methods have been used in order to measure the acquirer return during
the cross-border acquisition announcement. These methods can be divided into several groups.
By the types of data being used in the empirical test: those that utilizes accounting data from
financial statements, and those that employs stock price data. By the period which the test
covers: those that analyse long-term returns, and those that analyse short-term returns.
The use of accounting data is usually associated with long-term return analysis, such as the
study by Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) on acquisition performance by Russian acquirers,
in which return on assets (ROA) is used as the profitability measure; or the study by Capron
(1999), in which revenue data is used in the analysis. However, as the accounting standards vary
across different countries, use of accounting data might pose unnecessary risk of inaccuracy
especially in a multi country study. Another risk associated with the usage of accounting data
is the possibility of data manipulation Cording et al. (2008).
Buy and hold abnormal return (BHAR) is another measure used in some analysis of
long-term return (Bouwman et al., 2009). BHAR utilizes the long-term stock price based
data, often one or two years after the announcement, as an indicator of acquirer value change.
While the stock performance is considered to be relatively unbiased, there can be challenges in
using long-term stock price data. The main challenge is that there can be other factors, either
company related or market related, which impact the stock price during the time period between
acquisition announcement and the end of holding time.
Majority of the researches done on the subject of company value or shareholder wealth use
event study method with short-term stock return as an indicator (just to name a few: Aybar and
Ficici, 2009; Bhagat et al., 2011; Gubbi et al., 2010; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Seth
et al., 2002; Travlos, 1987). This kind of event study uses daily stock return over a short event
window. Such approach have several advantages: first of all, it adds precision in measuring the
market reaction; secondly, it minimises the possible impact of other uncorrelated events (Brown
and Warner, 1980; Jensen and Ruback, 1983).
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2.4. Main predictors of acquirer return
There are many predictors that have been used to study the acquirer return. In this
subsection, a few of those that are relevant to this thesis are listed and explained.
Based on institutional development, Gubbi et al. (2010) use several predictors of firm
value in their study of cross-border acquisitions by Indian firms, namely developed market
acquisitions, economic distance, and institutional distance. Meyer et al. (2009) argue that a
more developed institutional environment provides better intellectual property protection, as
well as offers lower cost of market transaction, which are very attractive to foreign companies.
Deng and Yang (2015) point out that higher institutional development is also associated with
better government effectiveness. Such effectiveness means sound economic and regulative
policies which makes them desirable to foreign investors. Gubbi et al. (2010) find significant
positive acquirer return when the target comes from a more developed institutional environment.
Natural resources are crucial elements to economic development. One of the main motives
for emerging market companies to conduct foreign acquisitions is to gain access and control
over a continuous supply of natural resources from the target nation (Deng and Yang, 2015;
Stucchi, 2012; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). Empirical test in one of the subsamples by
Deng and Yang (2015) show positive result between the natural resources availability in
the target nation and the number of foreign acquisitions by emerging market companies.
Nicholson and Salaber (2013) argue that the pursuit of natural resources varies among different
emerging markets, for instance, Chinese market is heavily involved in natural resources related
cross-border acquisitions, while India focuses more on other strategic assets. The results of their
study show higher return on acquiring company’s value when the acquirer comes from Chinese
manufacturing industry, which is the industry that is heavily dependent on natural resources.
An interesting finding to note by Deng and Yang (2015) is that there is a strong presence of
government ownership in those companies actively seeking natural resources.
As previously mentioned, government ownership in acquiring company is one important
perspective regarding value creation or destruction, as it has strong implication on the
company’s strategy planning and decision marking. Such influence is often observed in the
principal-principal conflict and the principal-agent conflict. In some of the emerging markets,
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government can interfere with the company’s operations through either becoming a majority
owner (the principal-principal conflict), or appointing government officials as managers with
decision-making power (the pricipal-agent conflict) (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Ning et al.,
2014). This is expecially noticeable in those industry sectors that are considered strategically
important, such as natural resources related industry (Deng and Yang, 2015). In the cross-border
acquisition process, through majority ownership or the government official appointed as
manager, the government will approach the deal in such way that first and for most its own
benefit or wealth is guaranteed, instead of the value creation for all the shareholders. Further
more, Chen and Young (2010) argue that the presence of government ownership in the acquiring
firm may present political problems in the target country. Empirical studies, such as those
conducted by Chen and Young (2010); Ning et al. (2014) confirm negative correlation between
government ownership and firm value during the cross-border acquisition announcements for
Chinese acquirers. One thing to note is that the use of government ownership involvement
and natural resources related targets as predictors are not very common in the multi-country
analysis. These two variable mainly appear in studies that focus on one single country.
Another interesting driver that influences both the acquirer return and the post-acquisition
integration is the cultural distance. Upon introduction, cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980)
have been widely used in organizational studies. In cross-border acquisition activities, the
greater the cultural distance, the higher the risk of cultural conflict, which can result in engaging
expensive and time-consuming culture turnaround (Hofstede, 1989). Cultural distance has
been used as one important predictor to evaluate the acquisition performance in a number of
researches (e.g.: Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Brock, 2005; Dikova and Rao Sahib, 2013; Morosini
et al., 1998; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013). It is argued in these studies that the culture distance
between the acquirer and the target has strong effect on the return of firm values, as well as
an invaluable role in post-acquisition integration, which consequently determines the ultimate
success of the acquisition. Empirical results are mixed though on whether close cultural
proximity produces more favourible return. Morosini et al. (1998); Sarala and Vaara (2010)
find positive result supporting the argument that closer cultural proximity enhances acquisition
performance, while Dikova and Rao Sahib (2013) find inconclusive results.
Capron and Shen (2007) carry out an extensive study on the target’s private or public status
and its implication on acquirer return. It is argued in the study that the favorable market reaction
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to private target acquisition is due to the so called “private firm discount”. Officer (2007)
document an average of 15 to 30 percent of acquisition discount on private targets. Capron and
Shen (2007) argue that as the acquirer is able to purchase a private target at a substantial discount
compared to purchasing a public target, it benefits from a more advantageous split of value
among itself and the target, that is, better value appropriation. Another important perspective
to value creation, according to Capron and Shen (2007), is the information availability for
target selection and evaluation during the acquisition activity. The capital market serves as an
information distribution and asset evaluation mechanism for publicly listed companies, while
the information on private companies can be more difficult to obtain, which means higher
search costs. Such difference in information availability affects acquirer’s target selection and
its performance during acquisition. The empirical result from Capron and Shen (2007) shows
that acquirers of private targets performs better at the acquisition announcements compared to
those acquiring public targets.
2.5. Hypotheses
Following the existing literature, a number of hypotheses are introduced. Although
there are contradictory findings with regard to acquirer return at the cross-border acquisition
announcements, it is widely expected as per the synergy hypothesis that the acquirer will enjoy
positive return from such announcement (Bradley et al., 1988; Seth, 1990; Kogut and Zander,
1993). In addition to synergy hypothesis, the bootstrapping hypothesis suggests that acquirers
will enjoy positive return from stock market when announcing the acquisition of a target from
an advanced economy (Khanna and Palepu, 2004; Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Bhagat
et al., 2011). Among different types of targets, those from developed markets will offer a series
of benefits to the acquirer. For instance, higher corporate governance, which will signal to
the capital market a potential improvement of the governance level in the acquirer. Another
potential benefit is the improved shareholder protection, which in turn will boost investor’s
confidence in the acquirer. Thus, the first hypothesis to be tested in this study is introduced
H.1: Emerging market acquirers enjoy positive abnormal returns when the target
company is from an advanced economy.
Government ownership involvement in the acquiring firm poses various risks, such as
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principal-principal conflict, principal-agent conflict (Claessens et al., 2000, 2002; Ning et al.,
2014). These conflicts deteriorate investor’s confidence in the company, which further affects
their investment decisions. Along several prior studies, a negative relationship between
acquirer’s government ownership and acquirer return is expected. Hence, the second hypothesis
is formulated as
H.2: Emerging market acquirers enjoy positive abnormal returns if there is no
government ownership involved.
In a recent study, Deng and Yang (2015) point out an interesting observation that there
is a strong presence of government ownership in those companies actively seeking natural
resources. Natural resources have always been considered strategically and politically crucial at
national level. Due to their importance, it is not surprising that emerging market governments
have strong hold and control in the natural resources related industries. Considering the
negative relationship between government ownership and acquirer return, it is then expected
that acquisitions in natural resources related industries will experience less favorable returns.
H.3: Emerging market acquirers enjoy positive abnormal returns from non-natural
resources related acquisitions.
Prior studies have suggested various possible predictors that influence acquirer return, such
as payment method, target status, cultural distance, institutional distance etc. In this study,
a number of relevant predictors are selected and tested to find evidence on whether these
predictors influence the acquirer’s abnormal return significantly. The fourth hypothesis consists
of several sub-hypotheses, each represents one selected predictor.
In testing the Indian originated cross-border acquisitions, Gubbi et al. (2010) use economical
distance and institutional distance, and find supporting evidence that acquirers benefit from
acquiring a target with higher governance standards. I use similar approach to test whether this
theory holds true for other emerging markets. Hence,
H.4a: Economic distance is positively related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
H.4b: Institutional distance is positively related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
A closer cultural proximity can reduce the risks related to cultural differences and can
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hence improve the post-acquisition integration Morosini et al. (1998); Sarala and Vaara (2010).
Therefore, it is assumed that the greater the cultural proximity, or cultural distance, the lower
the possibility of acquisition success. This leads to the following hypothesis
H.4c: Cultural distance is negatively related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
Bhagat et al. (2011) use the relative deal size as a variable. The relative deal size is calculated
as the ratio of transaction value to acquiring firm’s market capitalization. The empircal result
shows a significant positive relationship between the relative deal size and the acquirer return.
In this study, the relative deal size is also used as one predictors
H.4d: Relative deal size is a positive predictor of acquirer’s abnormal return.
Following the study by Capron and Shen (2007), the target company’s private or public
status is used as another variable in this thesis. Capron and Shen (2007) find a positive
correlation between target company’s private status and more favorable acquirer return. Thus,
the final hypothesis is introduced
H.4e: Private target status positively influences acquirer’s abnormal return.
19
3. Data
The definition of sample data, collection method and selection criteria are explained in this
section. A brief description of the data is also presented at the end of this section.
3.1. Definition of sample data
Fist of all, a selection of emerging markets are chosen. According to MSCI2, emerging
markets are defined based on three criteria: economic development, size and liquidity
requirements, and market accessibility. Different organizations have issued various list of
emerging markets. In this study, I choose five emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa, abbreviated to BRICS. All five countries are classified as emerging
markets according to different sources, such as MSCI3, IMF4, FTSE5. O’Neill (2001) initially
introduced the acronym BRIC to refer to the fast growing emerging markets of Brazil, Russia,
India, and China. In year 2010, South Africa joined the group and it has since been referred
to as BRICS. Based on the statistical data presented by BRICS6 and IMF, BRICS countries
represent approximately 20 percent of the gross world product. In addition, the five countries
show a great cultural and geographical diversity. Therefore, it is fair to say that they are the
icons of the current emerging markets and to certain extent can represent the overall emerging
economy.
Secondly, the time period covered by this study is defined as January 1, 1995 to December
31, 2014. The reason for selecting such time period is that during the early 1990s, there were
either significant political or economical changes in the BRICS countries. To name a few:
the establishment of the Russian Federation in 1991 after dissolution of the Soviet Union; the
2MSCI Market Classification Framework, http://www.msci.com/resources/products/indexes/
global_equity_indexes/gimi/stdindex/MSCI_Market_Classification_Framework.pdf (June 2014)
3MSCI Emerging Markets Indexes, http://www.msci.com/products/indexes/country_and_
regional/em/
4World Economic Outlook, Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2014/02/pdf/text.pdf (October 2014)
5FTSE Annual Country Classification Review, http://www.ftse.com/products/downloads/
FTSE-Country-Classification-Update_latest.pdf (September 2014)
6BRICS Joint Statistical Publication, http://brics.ibge.gov.br/downloads/BRICS_Joint_
Statistical_Publication_2014.pdf (2014)
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introduction of Plano Real7 in Brazil in 1994; dismantlement of Apartheid8 in South Africa in
1994. In addition, from the level of activity perspective, outbound cross-border acquisitions are
starting to grow popularity during the late 1990s among emerging markets.
3.2. Data collection
The data used in this study is obtained from two systems: Thomson Financial Securities
Data Company (SDC) and Thomson One.
The primary list of cross-border acquisitions are obtained from the Mergers and
Acquisitions database of SDC. The criteria of selection consist of:
• Acquirer nation is one of the BRICS countries.
• The deal has to be announced and completed during the time period January 1, 1995 to
December 31, 2014.
Using afore mentioned criteria, a total of 5143 observations are obtained. Various
information relating to the deals are also retrieved from SDC, including date announced, target
nation, target industry, acquirer industry, percentage of shares acquired, percentage owned after
transaction, value of transaction, target public status, acquirer public status, percentage of cash
or other types of payment, target government ownership involvement, and acquirer government
ownership involvement etc. Because stock returns are used as the measure of acquirer returns,
I further select the deals announced by publicly listed companies, that is, acquirer status being
public. This reduces the sample size to 2303.
Before retrieving the stock price data, a list of stocks being traded in the BRICS countries’
stock exchanges is obtained from Thomson One. This list is then matched against the acquirers
that exist in the primary cross-border acquisitions list, which returns a total number of 1304
deals.
7A set of economic measures introduced in 1994 to combat severe inflation problem and stabilize the Brazilian
economy.
8A system of racial segregation enforced in South Africa from 1948 to 1994.
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The stock price data is retrieved from Thomson One, as well as other related acquirer data,
such as acquirer’s market capitalisation from the last fiscal year, acquirer’s year of establishment
etc. In order to estimate the acquirer’s expected stock return, which is described in details
in Section 4 Methodology, one year of daily closing stock price of both the acquirer and the
benchmark index prior to the announcement date is required. There are a total of 1087 deals
that have the required stock price data available.
Upon further examination of the data, there are 129 cases where the same acquirer
announced multiple acquisitions during the 11 day event window, which can contaminate
the analysis as it will be hard to determine which announcement is driving the stock price
movement. Therefore, these cases are eliminated from the data set, leaving a final sample size
of 958 deals.
3.3. Data description
Table 1 gives an overview of the full sample, which consists of 958 cross-border acquisition
deals. The full sample is used in the event study.
As can be seem from Table 1, the number of cross-border acquisition deals conducted by
emerging markets has been growing since late 1990s. The first peak happened around 2007 and
2008, with a small dip in 2009, the second peak occurred immediately in 2010 and 2011 and
has since remained at a more steady level. The following Figure 1 shows the trend more clearly.
Figure 1 Number of cross-border acquisitions by country, full sample (N=958).
A further analysis of the major target markets and target industries is shown in Table 2. It
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Table 1 Number of cross-border acquisitions by country and by year, full sample.
This table contains the full sample of 958 acquisitions, listed by year of announcement and
acquirer country, which are used in the event study.
Year Brazil China India Russia South Africa Total
1995 1 1 2
1996 1 1
1997 3 3
1998 1 8 9
1999 3 7 10
2000 2 7 5 14
2001 1 2 7 10 20
2002 1 2 7 3 13
2003 1 1 14 5 21
2004 1 4 19 5 29
2005 1 2 44 2 11 60
2006 3 4 47 3 9 66
2007 6 9 76 9 10 110
2008 4 7 66 20 12 109
2009 6 15 32 18 14 85
2010 12 13 52 15 9 101
2011 8 18 43 17 11 97
2012 9 14 28 11 8 70
2013 5 25 19 6 10 65
2014 4 18 28 9 14 73
Total 65 135 493 110 155 958
is very obvious that most of the top target markets are those that are either geographically and
culturally very close to or previously politically tied to the acquirer nations.
As for target industries, there are some differences across the BRICS countries. Despite of
the differences, the natural resources related industries, such as Mining, Oil and Gas; Petroleum
Refining, are very popular targets among them all.
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Table 2 Top five target nations / regions and industries.
This table lists the most popular target nations and target industries for each of the BRICS
country. Deal% are ratios of the number of acquisitions conducted in the afore mentioned
target nations or target industries out of the total number of acquisitions from the same
acquirer nation over the time period between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2014. Top 5
target nations and top 5 target industries are not correlated. Top 5 target nations includes
regions as well. Region is defined as a special economic area which has significant different
economic characteristics compared to the acquirer market, such as Hong Kong.
Country Top 5 target nations Deal% Top 5 target industries Deal%
Brazil Argentina 24.6% Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 23.1%
United States 18.5% Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 10.8%
Uruguay 9.2% Transportation Equipment 9.2%
Portugal 7.7% Food and Kindred Products 7.7%
Mexico 6.2% Metal and Metal Products 4.6%
Russia Cyprus 11.8% Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 17.3%
Belarus 6.4% Mining 16.4%
Kazakhstan 6.4% Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 13.6%
Ukraine 5.5% Investment & Commodity Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 11.8%
Canada 4.5% Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 8.2%
India United States 26.8% Business Services 18.5%
United Kingdom 12.8% Drugs 12.4%
Germany 6.9% Prepackaged Software 7.1%
Australia 3.2% Chemicals and Allied Products 6.1%
Singapore 3.0% Mining 5.1%
China Hong Kong 17.0% Mining 14.1%
United States 14.8% Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 8.9%
Canada 11.1% Electronic and Electrical Equipment 8.9%
Australia 10.4% Investment & Commodity Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 8.1%
Germany 7.4% Machinery 7.4%
South Africa United Kingdom 25.8% Business Services 19.4%
Australia 15.5% Mining 15.5%
United States 5.8% Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 7.1%
Canada 4.5% Investment & Commodity Firms,Dealers,Exchanges 5.8%
Germany 4.5% Food and Kindred Products 5.2%
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4. Methodology
This section details the methodology used in this thesis. First of all, the event study,
including its structure and key components, is explained. Secondly, the cross-sectional
regression analysis and related variables are defined.
To test the hypotheses, I first use the event study to determine whether cross-border
acquisition announcements generate positive returns on acquirer value. The cumulative
abnormal return calculated from the event study is then regressed on a set of variables to see if
there are specific factors that drive the abnormal returns.
As the measurement of acquirer return, short-term stock performance is used in this study.
The stock performance is considered to be relatively unbiased compared to other measures of
firm value, such as accounting data (Cording et al., 2008). And the use of stock performance as
an assessment of firm value has been conducted in various studies (Doukas and Travlos, 1988;
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Gubbi et al., 2010).
4.1. Event study
Event study has been widely used in corporate finance to study the impact of new
information on the value of a firm. According to MacKinlay (1997), event study has its roots in
a study by Dolley (1933). The modern methodology of event study is introduced by Fama et al.
(1969) while studying the relationship between stock splits and stock returns. An event study
closely examines the impact of a new piece of information, aka the event, when introduced to
the market. It is therefore fitting to use this methodology to study the acquisition announcement
and its impact on the company’s stock return.
The general structure of an event study, according to MacKinlay (1997), consists the
following steps:
1. Specification of the research questions;
2. Definition of the event window;
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3. Selection of sample data;
4. Estimation of the expected returns;
5. Calculation of the abnormal returns;
6. Design of the test structure. Testing whether the abnormal return is statistically different
from zero.
The event study presented in this paper is conducted in a similar fashion. Research questions
are discussed in Section 2.5 Hypotheses. Data selection and collection are detailed in Section 3
Data. Other key items used in this study are addressed as follows:
4.1.1. Event window
Event window is the time span around the event day during which the analysis is conducted.
The length of the event window can be either long or short. It is determined based on the need
of each individual studay. In this paper, the event day, t = 0 is defined as the announcement day
of an acquisition. Three sets of event windows are introduced:
• 11-day event window, (–5, +5) days around the event day;
• 7-day event window, (–3, +3) days around the event day;
• 3-day event window, (–1, +1) days around the event day.
The reason for using different event windows is to capture the overall picture of the abnormal
return as much as possible, as it is expected that the cumulative abnormal return is different
during various event windows. Abnormal return is expected to be highest on the event day,
as well as one day immediately proceeding the event day. Hence, the event window (–1, +1)
should best capture any significant abnormal return.
In his study on efficient capital market, Fama (1970) argues that any abnormal return
observed in the stock price is only temporary, while in the long run, the stock price should
resume the random walk fashion. It is therefore expected that during the event window (–5,
+5), there should not be any statistically significant abnormal return.
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4.1.2. Abnormal returns
Abnormal return is defined as the difference between a stock’s actual return and its expected
return.
ARi,t = Ri,t E(Ri,t) (1)
where,
ARi,t is the abnormal return of stock i at time t,
Ri,t is the actual return of stock i at time t,
E(Ri,t) is the expected return of stock i at time t.
The actual return of a stock is calculated using the closing prices of two consecutive trading
days.
Ri,t =
Pi,t Pi,t 1
Pi,t 1
(2)
where,
Ri,t is the actual return of stock i at time t,
Pi,t is the closing price of stock i at time t,
Pi,t 1 is the closing price of stock i at time t 1, that is, one trading day prior to day t.
There are various ways of calculating the expected return, for instance, Capital Asset Pricing
Model (CAPM) (Sharpe, 1964), market and risk adjusted return model (Black, 1972; Brown
and Warner, 1980, 1985), market adjusted returns model (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985).
The most widely used model, however, is the market model introduced by Sharpe (1963). The
market model has been tested extensively in various event studies, such as the papers by Scholes
(1972), Brown and Warner (1980, 1985), MacKinlay (1997), Binder (1998), just to name a few.
The market model is applied in this study to estimate the expected stock return. The market
model suggests ordinary least square (OLS) regression of the stock return on the market return
during an estimation window outside the event period. The intercept and the slope of the
regression can be then used to estimate the expected return during the event period.
The estimation window is typically set to half a year to one year prior to the event period. In
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this study, the estimation window is defined as one year prior to the event window. In practice,
the closing prices of stocks and markets from days –255 to –6 are collected, based on which the
stock return and market return are calculated using Equation (2).
The expected return of a stock is then estimated using the following equation:
E(Ri,t) = ai+bi Rm,t+ ei,t (3)
E(ei,t) = 0
var(ei,t) = se2i
where,
E(Ri,t) is the expected return of stock i at time t,
ai is the estimator of stock i’s risk relative to the market, aka the intercept of the OLS
regression,
bi is the estimator of the volatility of stock i in comparison with the market portfolio, aka
the slope of the OLS regression,
Rm,t is the return of the market portfolio at time t,
ei,t is the zero mean disturbance term.
Taking into consideration the cultural and geographic diversity of the five different markets,
five different benchmark indexes are selected for each one of the BRICS countries:
• IBrX–50 Index for Brazilian market.
• MICEX Index for Russian market.
• CNX 500 Index for Indian market.
• SSE Composite Index for Chinese market.
• JALSH Index for South African market.
These market indexes are major ones in their respective markets, which should then provide
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a more reliable base for calculation. Thus, the abnormal return can be calculated as,
ARi,t = Ri,t  (ai+bi Rm,t) (4)
And the cumulative abnormal return, CAR, is defined as
CARi,(T1,T2) =
T2
Â
t=T1
ARi,t (5)
where,
T1 and T2 are the beginning and ending days of the event window.
4.1.3. Statistical test
To test whether the cumulative abnormal return is statistically indifferent from zero, t-test is
conducted with the following formula,
t =
CAR
s/pn
(6)
where,
CAR is cumulative average abnormal return,
s is standard deviation of the observed abnormal returns,
n is number of observations.
The t values are then compared to the critical values at the significant levels 10%, 5%, and
1% of the two-tailed test. The result is considered significant if the value of t is larger than the
critical value.
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4.2. Cross-sectional regression
As the second stage of the empirical test, cross-sectional regression analysis is used to find
out if certain factors play significant roles in influencing the acquirer’s abnormal return. One
thing to note is that, due to the information availability related to the sample acquisition deals,
the introduction of various variables further reduces the sample size. The detailed description
of the subsample is presented in the Section 5 Results along with different regression models.
4.2.1. Dependent variable
Based on several previous studies, the following variables are introduced as main factors
that could impact the cumulative abnormal return.
INDUSTRY: Industry relatedness, measures whether the acquirer and the target are in the
related industry. Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that abnormal return of acquirer is
positively affected when acquiring a target from related business. The industry relatedness
data is obtained through SDC. It takes the value 1 if the target company is in the same industry
as the acquirer, and value 0 otherwise.
TSTATUS: Target status, indicates the public status of the target company. With an extensive
study on the target status, Capron and Shen (2007) find that acquiring a private target positively
influences the abnormal return to the acquirer. This data is obtained through SDC. It takes the
value 1 is the target is a private company, and value 0 otherwise.
AGOVN: Acquirer’s government ownership involvement, shows whether the acquirer
company has government ownership. As previously mentioned, government ownership is a
potential risk factor which can raise principal-principal or principal-agent conflicts, which in
turn can cause value destruction. Empirical study also supports this view. Pan et al. (2010) find
that state or government ownership will deteriorate the acquirer return. This data is obtained
through SDC. It takes the value 1 if there is government ownership, and value 0 if not.
TGOVN: Target’s government ownership involvement, shows whether the target company
has government ownership. This data is obtained through SDC. It takes the value 1 if there is,
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and value 0 if not.
ACQAGE: Acquirer’s age, measures the years of establishment of the acquirer company
at the time of acquisition announcement. In one earlier study, Sapienza et al. (2006) argue
that companies benefit from early stage internationalization. Data on year of establishment is
retrieved from Thomson One.
OWNERSHIP: Level of ownership, indicates the target company’s percentage owned by
the acquirer after the transaction. This data is obtained through SDC. According to Gubbi
et al. (2010), majority ownership grants acquirer the access to target company’s strategic assets,
which is considered as an advantage to the acquirer. The level of ownership indicator takes the
value 1 if majority of the target’s ownership is transferred to the acquirer, and value 0 otherwise.
DEALSIZE: Deal size relative to the acquirer’s market value. Bhagat et al. (2011) find
positive correlation between relative deal size and the acquirer return. The relative deal size
is calculated by taking the logarithm of the ratio of the value of transaction to the market
capitalization of the acquirer. The value of transaction is obtained from SDC, while the market
capitalization value from the last fiscal year is retrieved from Thomson one.
TECOSTATUS: Target country’s economic status, indicates whether the target nation is
categorized as developed country or not. IMF’s world economic outlook publication9 is used as
the classification standard. A detailed list of the developed countries can be found in Appendix
A.
CASHPMNT: Cash payment, indicates if the deal is paid fully by cash. It takes the value 1
if the deal is fully cash financed, and value 0 otherwise. Moeller et al. (2004) run various tests
regarding payment method and acquirer return, and find that payment method can influence the
acquirer return, however not by itself but when taking into consideration at the same time the
target private or public status.
NATRES: Natural resources related industry, indicates whether the acquisition is natural
resources related. In this study, the natural resources related industry consists of the following
industries: Mining, Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining. This indicator takes the value 1 if the
9World Economic Outlook, Legacies, Clouds, Uncertainties, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
weo/2014/02/pdf/text.pdf (October 2014)
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acquisition is natural resources related, and value 0 otherwise.
ECODIST: Economic distance, measures the difference of the economic status in the
acquirer nation and the target nation. This measure is used by Tsang and Yip (2007) and Gubbi
et al. (2010) in their studies. The calculation method used by Gubbi et al. (2010) takes the
logarithm of the difference of the real gross domestic production (GDP) between the target
nation and the acquirer nation in the year when the acquisition is announced. However, I find
that the logarithm does not reflect the negative differences accurately enough, hence, economic
distance used in this study is calculated as the nominal difference of real GDP between the
target and acquirer nations.
INSTDIST: Institutional distance, measures the difference of the economic freedom in the
acquirer nation and the target nation. The use of the institutional distance measure has been seen
in studies conducted by Meyer et al. (2009) and Gubbi et al. (2010). It is calculated by taking
the ratio of the economic freedom index of the target nation to that of the acquirer nation from
the year when the acquisition is announced. Values greater than 1 reflects higher institutional
development of the target nation relative to the acquirer nation, while values smaller than 1
reflects lower relative institutional development. The economic freedom index is retrieved from
the Heritage Foundation10.
CULDIST: Cultural distance, is the proxy for the cultural distance between the acquirer
nation and the target nation. Following the study by Aybar and Ficici (2009) and Chakrabarti
et al. (2009), Hofstede’s cultural dimensions are used to calculate the cultural distance. The
calculation is done based on the method used by Nicholson and Salaber (2013),
CD=
vuut 4Â
j=1
(CDA, j CDT, j)2 (7)
where,
CD is the cultural distance,
CDA, j is the acquirer nation’s cultural index on dimension j,
CDT, j is the target nation’s cultural index on dimension j.
10Index of Economic Freedom http://www.heritage.org/index/
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Hofstede’s cultural index11 consists of six dimensions:
• Power distance index (PDI)
• Individualism versus collectivism (IDV)
• Masculinity versus femininity (MAS)
• Uncertainty avoidance index (UAI)
• Long term orientation versus short term normative orientation (LTO)
• Indulgence versus restraint (IND)
Due to the data availability, only the first four dimensions are used to calculate the cultural
distance between acquirer country and target country.
4.2.2. Cross-sectional analysis
The cross-sectional analysis is widely used in the firm value related event studies to
determine the main drivers of the value change (Aybar and Ficici, 2009; Gubbi et al., 2010;
Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013; Seth et al., 2002). Based on
the previous studies, the following cross-sectional multivariate model is used to shed light in
the impact of the previous mentioned various independent variables to the dependent variable,
the cumulative abnormal return value from event window (–1, +1),
CARi = b0+b1INDUSTRYi+b2TSTATUSi+b3AGOVNi+b4TGOVNi
+b5ACQAGEi+b6OWNERSHIPi+b7DEALSIZEi+b8TECOSTATUS
+b9CASHPMNTi+b10NATRESi+b11ECODISTi+b12INSTDISTi
+b13CULDISTi+ ei (8)
A correlation matrix is first constructed using the basic model with all of the variables.
In order to eliminate the multi-collinearity problem, several different models are set up using
11The Hofstede Centre http://geert-hofstede.com/cultural-dimensions.html
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the variables AGOVN, TECOSTATUS, ECODIST, INSTDIST, and CULDIST. The similar
cross-sectional regression is then run separately for these models. The details of the different
models are presented in the Section 5 Results.
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5. Results
The key findings of the empirical test are presented and discussed in this section. First of
all, the results from the event study is shown, followed by the results of the cross-sectional
regression analysis. After that, the limitations of the empirical test are discussed.
5.1. Event study results
For the event study, the daily abnormal return of acquirers is calculated and analyzed as a
first step. Results of daily abnormal return calculation of the full sample 958 deals is listed in
Table 3.
Table 3 Daily abnormal return, full sample.
This table presents the daily abnormal return of full sample, N = 958, from day –5 to day +5
around cross-border acquisition announcements by emerging market acquirers. Abnormal
returns are presented in percentages. Std dev. is the standard deviation.
Day Max AR Min AR Mean Median Std dev. positive:negative
–5 14.72% -32.98% -0.085% -0.15% 0.02736 448 : 510
–4 20.47% -30.53% -0.066% -0.097% 0.02856 447 : 511
–3 18.1% -31.11% -0.011% -0.086% 0.02704 456 : 502
–2 15.12% -43.1% 0.014% -0.107% 0.03031 458 : 500
–1 24.43% -34.98% 0.104% -0.103% 0.03344 451 : 507
0 27.09% -37.06% 0.498% 0.119% 0.03512 505 : 453
1 46.22% -37.98% 0.074% -0.094% 0.03547 450 : 508
2 17.44% -32.04% -0.166% -0.298% 0.0281 416 : 542
3 12.35% -37.79% -0.088% -0.182% 0.02829 431 : 527
4 38.98% -31.76% -0.165% -0.253% 0.03136 418 : 540
5 18.88% -38.87% -0.229% -0.169% 0.03187 430 : 528
The results show a wide range of abnormal returns from day –5 to day +5. However, if
looking at the average daily abnormal return, the highest value is observed on the announcement
day, at 0.498%. In addition, more acquirers experience positive daily abnormal return on the
announcement day than any other days during the event window. Apart from the announcement
day, on day –1 and day +1, acquirers also experience, on average, slightly higher abnormal
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returns than other days during the event window at 0.104% and 0.074% respectively. It is worth
noting that the single highest daily abnormal return is observed on day +1, at 46.22%. Another
interesting observation is that only on the announcement day do the positive daily abnormal
returns take the majority position, while on all the other days during the event window majority
of the daily abnormal returns are negative.
In summary, daily abnormal returns show that emerging market acquirers benefit from
cross-border acquisition announcements, with a positive 0.498% return on the stock on average.
A brief check on the announcement day abnormal return frequency can be found in Figure
2. As shown in the figure, majority of the daily abnormal returns on the announcement day
range between –1% to +1%.
Figure 2 Frequency of announcement day abnormal return of full sample (N=958).
Based on the daily abnormal return calculation, cumulative abnormal returns of the acquirers
are calculated. To test different hypotheses, the cumulative abnormal return analysis is
conducted through several different data panels, which can be seen in Table 4. A total of four
different data panels are used:
• Panel A is the full sample, containing all 958 cross-border acquisition announcements.
• Panel B divides the full sample into two subgroups using developed market targets as the
category.
• Panel C uses the category of government ownership involvement or not in the acquirer.
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• Panel D specifies whether the acquisition is natural resources related or not.
Calculated cumulative abnormal return and its analysis can be seen in Table 4.
For the full sample size of 958 announcements (Panel A), the highest value of cumulative
abnormal return, 0.68%, is observed in the 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1). This figure is
statistically significant based on the t test result, that is, emerging market acquirers in general
enjoy positive returns from cross-border acquisition announcements.
In Panel B, the full sample is divided into two subgroups, those deals with target company
from developed countries, and those with target company from non developed countries.
Comparing the cumulative abnormal return from the 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1),
emerging market acquirers enjoy an average positive return at 0.85% when they purchase target
companies from developed markets, in contrast to acquisitions of non developed market targets,
which only generate an average of 0.28% non statistically significant cumulative abnormal
return.
In the previous study by Gubbi et al. (2010), it is shown that acquirers from India enjoy
higher positive return when they purchase targets from developed markets. The result from
Panel B is in line with this finding from Gubbi et al. (2010), as well as showing a generalized
trend in emerging market acquirers. This result also means that Hypothesis 1 is accepted at full
sample level.
The following two subgroups of Panel C outline the results of acquirer’s cumulative
abnormal return taking into consideration the government ownership involvement in acquirer.
When the acquirer has government ownership involvement, the average cumulative abnormal
return value from 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1) is negative, –0.06%. On the other hand,
if no government ownership is involved, the acquirer benefits from significant positive return at
0.76%.
This result is consistent with the prior researches (Chen and Young, 2010; Pan et al., 2010),
that the government ownership involvement is usually seen as a negative thing by investors.
Hence, Hypothesis 2 is accepted based on full sample analysis.
When it comes to the natural resources related acquisitions, the results of Panel D are
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definitely very interesting. The non natural resources related deals give the acquirer statistically
significant positive return at 0.66%, very similar to the overall return from the full sample,
during the 3-day event window, However, those acquirers which announce purchase of natural
resources related targets also experience positive returns, in fact, even slightly higher returns at
0.77%. Another interesting result to point out is that during the 7-day and 11-day event window,
natural resources related acquisitions generate significant positive returns for the acquirers at
1.62% and 1.65% respectively, which are the highest average cumulative abnormal returns
observed among all Panels across all event windows.
This result is contradictory to the expectation. Deng and Yang (2015) find that there is
a strong presence of government ownership in natural resources related industries, thus, it is
expected that similar results would appear in Panels C and D. However, while results from Panel
C suggest that non government owned acquirers enjoy significant positive returns, results from
Panel D show that acquirers enjoy significant positive return from non natural resources related
acquisitions in 3-day event window and significant positive returns from natural resources
related acquisitions in 7-day and 11-day event windows. In short, Hypothesis 3 is rejected
according to the results from full sample data analysis.
A careful review of the data sample from Panel D shows no evidence of data contamination.
Although efforts have been made to find potential explanations for such results, given the
available information, no concrete answer has been uncovered. An earlier study by Nicholson
and Salaber (2013) show that Chinese manufacturing companies benefit from positive returns
when announcing natural resources related acquisitions. It is then a speculation that perhaps,
under certain circumstance, investors view the natural resources related acquisitions as a good
opportunity for the acquiring company’s growth, or a guarantee for the acquiring company’s
sustainability. This can be suggested as a separate topic to be examined in details in another
study.
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Table 4 Cumulative abnormal return, full sample.
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return of full sample, N = 958, during
announcement period of cross-border acquisitions by emerging market companies. Panel A is
the full sample, Panel B divides the sample by whether the target company is from developed
countries or not, Panel C divides the sample by whether the acquirer has government
ownership, and Panel D divides the sample by whether the target company is in natural
resources related industries. CAR (–5, +5), CAR (–3, +3), CAR (–1, +1) are the cumulative
abnormal returns of the corresponding event windows. Std dev. is the standard deviation.
Natural resource related industry refers to either Mining industry or Oil and Gas; Petroleum
Refining industry. Cumulative abnormal returns are presented in percentages. * Cumulative
abnormal return is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). ** Cumulative abnormal return is
significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *** Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the
0.01 level (2-tailed).
Event window Mean Median Std dev. positive : negative t test
Panel A. Full data sample, N = 958
CAR (–5, +5) -0.12% -0.43% 0.1515 458 : 500 -0.241
CAR (–3, +3) 0.43% 0.02% 0.1078 482 : 476 1.223
CAR (–1, +1) 0.68% 0.17% 0.0615 499 : 459 3.402***
Panel B (1). Target company from developed countries, N = 669
CAR (–5, +5) -0.16% -0.42% 0.1714 321 : 348 -0.238
CAR (–3, +3) 0.36% 0.05% 0.122 338 : 331 0.755
CAR (–1, +1) 0.85% 0.25% 0.0666 360 : 309 3.285***
Panel B (2). Target company from non developed countries, N = 289
CAR (–5, +5) -0.03% -0.44% 0.0904 137 : 152 -0.051
CAR (–3, +3) 0.59% -0.04% 0.0639 144 : 145 1.564
CAR (–1, +1) 0.28% -0.07% 0.0475 139 : 150 1.012
Panel C (1). Government ownership involvement in acquirer company, N = 100
CAR (–5, +5) 0.21% 0.03% 0.0603 50 : 50 0.348
CAR (–3, +3) 0.44% 0.46% 0.0456 60 : 40 0.969
CAR (–1, +1) -0.06% -0.1% 0.0346 48 : 52 -0.179
Panel C (2). Acquirer company doesn’t involve government ownership, N = 858
CAR (–5, +5) -0.16% -0.46% 0.1588 408 : 450 -0.288
CAR (–3, +3) 0.42% -0.06% 0.1128 422 : 436 1.101
CAR (–1, +1) 0.76% 0.2% 0.0639 451 : 407 3.495***
Panel D (1). Acquisition in natural resources related industry, N = 136
CAR (–5, +5) 1.65% 0.56% 0.105 71 : 65 1.828*
CAR (–3, +3) 1.62% 0.75% 0.071 79 : 57 2.663***
CAR (–1, +1) 0.77% 0.09% 0.0576 69 : 67 1.552
Panel D (2). Acquisition in non-natural resources related industry, N = 822
CAR (–5, +5) -0.41% -0.61% 0.1578 387 : 435 -0.745
CAR (–3, +3) 0.23% -0.07% 0.1126 403 : 419 0.581
CAR (–1, +1) 0.66% 0.18% 0.0622 430 : 392 3.05***
39
5.2. Cross-sectional analysis
The cross-sectional analysis is done based on the subsample of 535 deals. In this subsection,
the detailed description regarding the subsample is first presented, followed by the results of the
cross-sectional regression analysis.
5.2.1. Subsample description
The subsample is obtained through screening the full sample with the different variables that
are detailed in the Section 4 Methodology. Due to the data availability, each time a new variable
is introduced, the sample size decreases. In this thesis, a total of 14 variables are introduced
for the cross-sectional analysis, as a result, a big portion of the original sample is eliminated
due to lack of related information. After sorting through the data regarding the 14 variables, a
subsample of 535 cross-border acquisition deals is obtained. The number of deals conducted by
country and by year can be seen in Table 5 and Figure 3. The number of deals exhibits similar
trend as in the full sample: cross-border acquisition deals originated from India composite a
major portion of the sample, as well as deals from China since year 2009.
Figure 3 Number of cross-border acquisitions by country, subsample (N=535).
In addition to the number of deals, the subsample also contains sufficient information on
deal size in terms of transaction value. Table 6 gives more detailed information regarding deal
size. As can be seen from the table, during year 2010, the highest total value of cross-border
acquisitions deals were announced. This trend was especially noticeable in Brazil and India.
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Table 5 Number of cross-border acquisitions by country and by year, subsample.
This table contains the subsample of 535 acquisitions, listed by year of announcement and
acquirer country, which are used in the cross-sectional analysis.
Year Brazil China India Russia South Africa Total
1995 1 1 2
1997 3 3
1998 1 6 7
1999 2 4 6
2000 2 3 3 8
2001 1 1 5 7 14
2002 1 2 6 2 11
2003 1 1 9 4 15
2004 2 13 5 20
2005 1 1 19 6 27
2006 2 2 25 2 7 38
2007 2 5 45 5 7 64
2008 1 5 33 5 9 53
2009 4 12 13 7 9 45
2010 7 11 31 5 5 59
2011 6 13 19 7 6 51
2012 7 11 12 4 8 42
2013 3 14 8 7 32
2014 2 15 10 4 7 38
Total 41 96 254 39 105 535
Prior to conducting the detailed cross-sectional analysis, event study method is first applied
to the subsample data. This can be considered as a robustness checking process, to make sure
that the findings from the full sample event study also hold true for the subsample data.
Daily abnormal return analysis can be seen in Table 7. The results are very similar to those
observed in the full sample, where the highest average daily abnormal return is seen on the
announcement day, at 0.495%. In the subsample, the single highest daily abnormal return is
also observed on the announcement day at 27.09%, whereas in the full sample it is found on
day +1.
It can be therefore argued, based on the daily abnormal return from both full sample and
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Table 6 Value of cross-border acquisitions by country and by year, subsample.
This is the subsample analysis of 535 acquisitions by year of announcement and acquirer
country, which are used in the cross-sectional analysis. Figures are given in million US
dollars.
Year Brazil China India Russia South Africa Total
1995 1 6 8
1997 470 470
1998 79 284 364
1999 2 130 132
2000 573 20 55 648
2001 69 17 39 465 590
2002 90 394 808 6 1 297
2003 12 135 291 60 497
2004 35 154 339 528
2005 13 26 418 638 1 095
2006 402 3 502 1 190 800 660 6 555
2007 400 508 5 641 6 594 348 13 491
2008 4 71 6 486 1 404 492 8 457
2009 624 1 796 489 2 711 870 6 490
2010 4 242 1 727 13 245 2 602 1 203 23 018
2011 315 1 214 1 668 4 163 2 674 10 034
2012 909 446 1 801 3 941 1 433 8 529
2013 157 6 221 250 2 221 8 848
2014 194 3 252 603 3 024 2 637 9 709
Total 8 082 19 344 33 111 25 240 14 986 100 762
subsample, that emerging market acquirers enjoy an average of about 0.5% return on their
stock prices on the cross-border acquisition announcements.
Based on the daily abnormal return data, the cumulative abnormal return is calculated from
the subsample. In Table 8, the detailed results of subsample event study are shown. Panels E, F,
G, H in the subsample correspond to Panels A, B, C, D in the full sample. The results are quite
similar to those from full sample. Overall, emerging market acquirers enjoy favorable returns
at the announcement of cross-border acquisitions. When emerging market acquirers purchase
targets from developed markets, they experience significant positive return compared to those
purchase targets from non developed markets. Acquirers without any government ownership
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Table 7 Daily abnormal return, subsample.
This table presents the daily abnormal return of subsample, N = 535, which are used in the
cross-sectional analysis, from day –5 to day +5 around cross-border acquisition
announcements by emerging market acquirers. Abnormal returns are presented in percentages.
Std dev. is the standard deviation.
Day Max AR Min AR Mean Median Std dev. positive:negative
–5 14.72% -32.98% -0.041% -0.163% 0.02924 253 : 282
–4 20.47% -30.53% -0.05% -0.064% 0.03058 260 : 275
–3 9,00% -31.11% -0.018% -0.085% 0.02727 256 : 279
–2 15.12% -43.1% 0.041% -0.175% 0.03396 253 : 282
–1 20.85% -34.98% 0.118% -0.123% 0.03627 250 : 285
0 27.09% -31.62% 0.495% 0.196% 0.03549 278 : 257
1 25.07% -37.98% 0.076% -0.068% 0.03459 256 : 279
2 12.64% -32.04% -0.174% -0.309% 0.02932 232 : 303
3 10.46% -37.79% -0.076% -0.209% 0.02992 240 : 295
4 13.78% -31.76% -0.231% -0.249% 0.0313 232 : 303
5 14.65% -38.87% -0.289% -0.226% 0.03232 233 : 302
involvement enjoy significant positive cumulative abnormal return compared to those acquirers
with government ownership. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are hence both accepted at subsample level.
Natural resources related acquisitions again show interesting results compared to those of
the full sample. In the subsample, although results from Panel H(1) show positive returns
from all event windows for acquirers of natural resources related deals, these results lack of
statistical significance. On the other hand, acquirers of non natural resources related deals do
enjoy a significant positive cumulative abnormal return during event window day –1 to day +1.
This result is in line with the expectation, and Hypothesis 3 is accepted based on the subsample
analysis.
One thing to note is that the subgroup samples for Panel G(1) and Panel H(1) are much
smaller compared to the other panels, both below 100, so it lacks the desired statistical
significance, though it gives some information on the general trend. Overall, the event study
result of the subsample confirms the earlier results from the full sample. So it can be said that
the event study results are reliable.
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Table 8 Cumulative abnormal return, subsample.
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return of subsample, N = 535, which are used in the
cross-sectional analysis, during announcement period of cross-border acquisitions by
emerging market companies. Panel E contain all 535 deals of subsample, Panel F divides the
subsample by whether the target company is from developed countries or not, Panel G divides
the subsample by whether the acquirer has government ownership, and Panel H divides the
subsample by whether the target company is in natural resources related industries. CAR (–5,
+5), CAR (–3, +3), CAR (–1, +1) are the cumulative abnormal returns of the corresponding
event windows. Std dev. is the standard deviation. Natural resource related industry refers to
either Mining industry or Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining industry. Cumulative abnormal
returns are presented in percentages. * Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.10
level (2-tailed). ** Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ***
Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Event window Mean Median Std dev. positive : negative t test
Panel E. Subsample of data included in cross-sectional analysis, N = 535
CAR (–5, +5) -0.15% -0.32% 0.1881 258 : 277 -0.183
CAR (–3, +3) 0.46% 0.24% 0.1306 275 : 260 0.819
CAR (–1, +1) 0.69% 0.18% 0.0719 279 : 256 2.215**
Panel F (1). Subsample, target company from developed countries, N = 394
CAR (–5, +5) -0.24% -0.36% 0.213 190 : 204 -0.22
CAR (–3, +3) 0.5% 0.36% 0.1485 209 : 185 0.673
CAR (–1, +1) 0.9% 0.25% 0.078 211 : 183 2.295**
Panel F (2). Subsample, target company from non developed countries, N = 141
CAR (–5, +5) 0.09% -0.16% 0.0868 68 : 73 0.128
CAR (–3, +3) 0.35% -0.13% 0.0564 66 : 75 0.734
CAR (–1, +1) 0.09% -0.15% 0.0512 68 : 73 0.22
Panel G (1). Subsample, government ownership involvement in acquirer company, N = 56
CAR (–5, +5) 0.52% -0.62% 0.0655 26 : 30 0.591
CAR (–3, +3) 0.51% 0.36% 0.0485 32 : 24 0.788
CAR (–1, +1) -0.21% -0.02% 0.0364 27 : 29 -0.442
Panel G (2). Subsample, acquirer company doesn’t involve government ownership, N = 479
CAR (–5, +5) -0.23% -0.32% 0.1975 232 : 247 -0.252
CAR (–3, +3) 0.46% 0.18% 0.1371 243 : 236 0.729
CAR (–1, +1) 0.79% 0.23% 0.075 252 : 227 2.32**
Panel H (1). Subsample, acquisition in natural resources related industry, N = 86
CAR (–5, +5) 1.84% 0.67% 0.0995 45 : 41 -1.256
CAR (–3, +3) 1.88% 0.75% 0.0632 50 : 36 0.193
CAR (–1, +1) 0.62% 0.17% 0.064 46 : 40 1.004
Panel H (2). Subsample, acquisition in non-natural resources related industry, N = 449
CAR (–5, +5) -0.53% -0.48% 0.2005 213 : 236 0.025
CAR (–3, +3) 0.19% 0.05% 0.1398 225 : 224 0.796
CAR (–1, +1) 0.7% 0.18% 0.0734 233 : 216 2.026**
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5.2.2. Cross-sectional regression results
The cross-sectional regression results are presents in three parts, first of all, a brief
descriptive statistics of the different variables; secondly, the correlation check of the variables;
and finally, the results of the regression of several models.
Table 9 shows the descriptive statistics of variables. It can be seen that most of the
cross-border acquisitions are conducted in the related industry. In most deals, the acquirer
purchases majority of the target ownership. This reflects the argument from previous literature
(Gubbi et al., 2010) that the advantage of access to strategically import assets is very crucial and
only majority ownership would guarantee such access. The averages of target economic status
(TECOSTATUS) and institutional distance (INSTDIST) variables are reasonably high, meaning
that emerging market acquirers are more drawn to the targets from advanced economies or
relatively higher institutional distance.
Table 9 Descriptive statistics of variables.
INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of ownership after
acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment; AGOVN:
acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government ownership
involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of transaction
value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related industry;
TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. Std dev. is the standard
deviation.
Variables N Minimum Maximum Mean Std dev.
INDUSTRY 535 0 1 0.59 0.492
OWNERSHIP 535 0 1 0.78 0.418
TSTATUS 535 0 1 0.41 0.493
CASHPMNT 535 0 1 0.35 0.476
AGOVN 535 0 1 0.1 0.306
TGOVN 535 0 1 0.04 0.194
ACQAGE 535 2 203 30.9 28.326
DEALSIZE 535 -12.27 2.09 -3.6 2.111
NATRES 535 0 1 0.16 0.368
TECOSTATUS 535 0 1 0.74 0.441
INSTDIST 535 0 1 0.89 0.311
ECODIST 535 -10155.07 103241.17 29423.55 19261.785
CULDIST 475 14.18 101.8 52.71 19.751
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Table 10 Correlation of variables.
INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status;
CASHPMNT: cash payment; AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government ownership involvement;
ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural
resources related industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance; ECODIST: economic distance;
CULDIST: cultural distance. CAR(–1,+1) is the cumulative abnormal return from 3 day event window. N = 535 for variables CAR(–1,+1),
INDUSTRY, OWNERSHIP, TSTATUS, CASHPMNT, AGOVN, TGOVN, ACQAGE, DEALSIZE, NATRES, TECOSTATUS, INSTDIST, and
ECODIST. N = 475 for variable CULDIST. * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
(2-tailed).
Variables 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14
01. CAR (–1, +1) 1
02. INDUSTRY -0.031 1
03. OWNERSHIP 0.014 0.017 1
04. TSTATUS 0.063 -0.043 0.142** 1
05. CASHPMNT 0.026 -0.066 0.08 -0.091* 1
06. AGOVN -0.043 0.086* -0.138** -0.188** -0.018 1
07. TGOVN 0.013 0.031 0.039 -0.170** -0.026 0.277** 1
08. ACQAGE 0.006 0.061 -0.027 -0.019 -0.006 0.035 -0.111* 1
09. DEALSIZE 0.083 -0.062 0.213** 0.078 -0.019 -0.219** -0.051 -0.118** 1
10. NATRES -0.012 -0.039 -0.009 -0.016 0.013 -0.033 -0.036 -0.038 -0.038 1
11. TECOSTATUS 0.049 -0.092* 0.014 0.028 0.051 -0.128** -0.098* -0.099* 0.151** 0.031 1
12. INSTDIST 0.044 -0.021 0.058 0.061 -0.012 -0.116** -0.115** -0.163** 0.089* 0.022 0.528** 1
13. ECODIST 0.041 -0.106* 0.031 0.043 0.068 -0.149** -0.129** -0.071 0.181** -0.033 0.782** 0.521** 1
14. CULDIST 0.023 -0.004 -0.026 -0.004 0.064 0.144** 0.117* -0.200** -0.02 -0.003 0.262** 0.150** 0.344** 1
46
Table 10 presents the correlation among all variables. As can be seen in the table, some
of the variables, such as acquirer’s government ownership involvement (AGOVN), target
economic status (TECOSTATUS), economic distance (ECODIST) etc, have strong correlations
with many other variables. It is therefore important to further define different models of the
subsample prior to conduct the cross-sectional analysis.
To reduce collinearity and achieve more accurate result, based on the correlation analysis,
the cross-sectional analysis is constructed by using six different models. Model 1 uses
the variables of industry relatedness (INDUSTRY), majority ownership (OWNERSHIP),
target status (TSTATUS), cash payment (CASHPMNT), target governement involvement
(TGOVN), acquirer age (ACQAGE), relative deal size (DEALSIZE), and natural resources
relatedness (NATRES) to run the ordinary least square (OLS) regression. Model 2 through
6 each introduces one additional variable: acquirer government involvement (AGOVN),
target economic status (TECOSTATUS), institutional distance (INSTDIST), economic distance
(ECODIST), and cultural distance (CULDIST) respectively. It is to be noted that the cultural
distance (CULDIST) data is only available for 475 deals out of the 535 subsample acquisitions.
Detailed information on the data size of different models can be found in Table 12.
In order to make sure that collinearity is not a problem for the current six-model-setup in
the cross-sectional regression analysis, variance inflation factor (VIF) is calculated for all six
models. As can be seen in Table 11, the VIF values are around 1, which means that there is no
collinearity problem in the analysis.
The final results of the cross-sectional regression analysis are presented in Table 12. It is
to be noted that only one variable returns statistically significant result, the relative deal size
(DEALSIZE), which is positively related to acquirer return. This result confirms that findings
from the previous study by Bhagat et al. (2011), which shows relative size and acquirer return
have a significant positive correlation.
Other results from cross-sectional regression, though not significant, still provide some
interesting perspectives. As shown in the results, acquirer’s government ownership involvement
(AGOVN) has negative impact on the acquirer return. This result is in line with previous studies
by Chen and Young (2010) and it is also in line with the findings from the event study. Target
economic status (TECOSTATUS) and institutional distance (INSTDIST) both have positive
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Table 11 Collinearity check of cross-sectional regression.
Variance inflation factor (VIF) is used as an indicator of collinearity. VIF values being around
1 indicate that there is no inter-correlation between the predictors. INDUSTRY: industry
relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s
private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment; AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership
involvement; TGOVN: target’s government ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age;
DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of transaction value to acquirer’s market
capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s
economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance; ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST:
cultural distance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN 1.176
TECOSTATUS 1.051
INSTDIST 1.054
ECODIST 1.069
CULDIST 1.06
(Constant)
INDUSTRY 1.017 1.021 1.022 1.017 1.025 1.019
OWNERSHIP 1.084 1.095 1.084 1.086 1.084 1.126
TSTATUS 1.072 1.088 1.072 1.072 1.072 1.091
CASHPMNT 1.027 1.027 1.029 1.027 1.031 1.039
TGOVN 1.058 1.133 1.067 1.076 1.074 1.051
ACQAGE 1.035 1.036 1.043 1.065 1.039 1.078
DEALSIZE 1.076 1.11 1.095 1.079 1.104 1.105
NATRES 1.007 1.008 1.008 1.007 1.009 1.012
influence on the acquirer return. This is as expected based on the earlier study by Gubbi et al.
(2010), as these two variables are closely related to each other and they have positive effects on
acquirer return. Gubbi et al. (2010) also find positive correlation between economic distance
(ECODIST) and acquirer return, however, the empircal result in this thesis find no evidence of
any kind of relationship between the two. The empirical result on cultural distance (CULDIST)
shows that it has barely any impact on the acquirer return at all, this is similar to the result found
by Nicholson and Salaber (2013). It can be argued that the cultural distance variable used in
this test utilizes the cultural difference at national level, however, there is also the corporate
level cultural difference at play. Hence it might be more informative to find a way to include
corporate cultural difference between acquirer and target in other new studies.
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Interestingly, industry relatedness (INDUSTRY) and majority ownership (OWNERSHIP)
both reduce acquirer returns, which are contradictory to prior studies and expectations, as
Gubbi et al. (2010); Singh and Montgomery (1987) argue that these two variables positively
impact the acquirer return. Target’s private status (TSTATUS) is positively related to acquirer
return, this is in line with the findings from Capron and Shen (2007). Acquirer return also
benefits from full cash payment (CASHPMNT). Target’s government ownership involvement
(TGOVN) positively influence the acquirer return, which is the opposite compared to the
acquirer’s government ownership involvement. Although Sapienza et al. (2006) argue that early
stage internationalization benefits acquiring companies, there is no evidence found in relation to
the acquirer age (ACQAGE) in this study. Natural resources (NATRES) relatedness negatively
impact the acquirer return in all models except the model 6, in which the cultural distance is
introduced. This is arguably different to the findings from the event study, where there is lack
of evidence that acquirers of natural resources related deals suffer from lower acquirer returns.
It could be that there are other elements in play in the natural resources related acquisitions that
influence that cumulative abnormal return in the event study.
The above mentioned variables, although they show either positive or negative relationship
to the acquirer return, none but one shows any statistical significance. The only variable that
constantly shows statistical significance across all models is the relative deal size (DEALSIZE).
The bigger the transaction value relative to the acquirer’s capitalization, the higher return the
acquirer experiences. This result is consistent with the prior study by Bhagat et al. (2011).
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Table 12 Results of cross-sectional regression.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. * Regression coefficient is
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN -0.006
(-0.547)
TECOSTATUS 0.0063
(0.871)
INSTDIST 0.01
(0.975)
ECODIST 0,0000
(0.585)
CULDIST 0.0001
(0.492)
(Constant) 0.0136 0.0139 0.0078 0.004 0.0099 0.0087
(1.252) (1.281) (0.61) (0.273) (0.785) (0.576)
INDUSTRY -0.0033 -0.0031 -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.003 -0.0042
(-0.518) (-0.482) (-0.454) (-0.514) (-0.465) (-0.615)
OWNERSHIP -0.0029 -0.0033 -0.0028 -0.0032 -0.0028 -0.0031
(-0.369) (-0.421) (-0.355) (-0.412) (-0.366) (-0.363)
TSTATUS 0.0098 0.0094 0.0098 0.0097 0.0098 0.0117*
(1.501) (1.423) (1.497) (1.478) (1.494) (1.653)
CASHPMNT 0.0052 0.0052 0.005 0.0054 0.005 0.0045
(0.792) (0.783) (0.749) (0.808) (0.752) (0.634)
TGOVN 0.0124 0.0148 0.0137 0.0144 0.0136 0.0156
(0.75) (0.864) (0.828) (0.868) (0.815) (0.771)
ACQAGE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.506) (0.525) (0.581) (0.663) (0.542) (0.539)
DEALSIZE 0.0029* 0.0027* 0.0027* 0.0028* 0.0027* 0.0029*
(1.885) (1.759) (1.751) (1.834) (1.767) (1.722)
NATRES -0.0014 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0012 0.0007
(-0.166) (-0.183) (-0.189) (-0.179) (-0.143) (0.076)
R2 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015
N 535 535 535 535 535 475
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5.2.3. Robustness check and country level analysis
In an effort to further understand the potential differences among the selected countries, as
well as test the robustness of the results, event study analysis and cross-sectional analysis are
carried out at country level samples. As mentioned earlier, the number of deals varies greatly
among the countries, few countries have very small sample size for the cross-sectional analysis
(e.g. Brazil: 41; Russia: 39), hence the result lacks statistical significance. The results of these
country level analysis are presented in Section Appendices as a complimentary part of this study.
However, they do shed some light in further understanding of the country level differences.
The event study results are shown in Appendices B and C. In the full sample analysis,
Indian acquirers enjoy significant positive returns from cross-border acquisition announcements
during the 3-day event window, while the Chinese acquirers benefit from significant positive
returns during the 3-day and 7-day event windows. In the subsample analysis, both Chinese and
South African acquirers get significant positive returns during 7-day and 11-day event windows,
and the average cumulative abnormal returns are well over 1%. In all other cases, emerging
market acquirers don’t seem to enjoy significant positive returns from cross-border acquisition
announcements.
The cross-sectional regression results are shown in Appendices D to H. In case of
Brazil, none of the variables has any significant correlation with the acquirer return. For
Chinese acquirers, their return is positively correlated to purchase of majority ownership
(OWNERSHIP), acquirer age (ACQAGE), and relative deal size (DEALSIZE). Relative
deal size (DEALSIZE) also positively impact Indian acquirers’ returns in two models. In
case of Russian acquirers, their return is negatively correlated to acquirer age (ACQAGE).
South African acquirers’ return would be reduced if they purchase majority ownership
(OWNERSHIP).
As can be seen from the results, some variables can present totally opposite coefficients
among different countries. Take purchase of majority ownership (OWNERSHIP) for example,
it benefits the Chinese acquirers while hurting the South African ones. Another example is
the acquirer age (ACQAGE), which is positively related to Chinese acquirer’s return but is
negatively related to Russian acquirer’s return. That is, Russian acquirers benefit from early
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stage of internationalization, while the stock market rewards more seasoned Chinese acquirers
than younger ones. This also provides some underlying reasons as to why in the earlier analysis
(Table 12) only one variable has shown statistical significance. Due to the counter effect from
country level data, the overall result can be either diluted and skewed.
Another important thing to note is that the R square value from the regression analysis is
improved by big margins when conducting country level analysis compared to the total sample
analysis. It is therefore suggested that this kind of country comparison research can be an
interesting topic for future studies.
5.3. Results summary and limitations
In Section 2.5 Hypotheses, a total of eight hypotheses, including five sub-hypotheses,
are introduced. The event study provides answers to the first three hypotheses, while the
cross-sectional regression analysis provides answers to the remaining five. According to the
event study results from both the full sample and the subsample, emerging market acquirers
enjoys significant positive returns when the target companies originate from developed markets,
consistent with the prior study by Gubbi et al. (2010). Another confirmation of the hypotheses
is that emerging market acquirers experience significant positive returns when the acquirers
themselves don’t have government ownership involvement, in line with the earlier findings from
Chen and Young (2010). These two findings are based on the results from 3-day event window
CAR(–1, +1) mean that the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are both accepted. The test results
of Hypothesis 3, however, presented mixed results. In the full sample analysis, the emerging
market acquirers of both natural resources related deals and non natural resource related deals
experience positive abnormal returns, though during different event windows, thus, rejecting
Hypothesis 3. On the other hand, subsample event study results accept Hypothesis 3, that
emerging market acquirers of non natural resources related targets enjoy positive returns during
3-day event window CAR(–1, +1).
The five sub-hypothesis of Hypothesis 4 are tested using the cross-sectional regression
analysis. The only one being accepted is Hypothesis 4d, that relative deal size of the acquisition
transaction to the acquirer’s market capitalization is positively related to the acquirer return,
which is consistent with the previous study by Bhagat et al. (2011). Hypothesis 4a and 4c are
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both rejected, as economic distance and cultural distance don’t produce any significant result.
The remaining two Hypothesis 4b and 4e are both supported, that the institutional distance and
target company’s private status are positively related to the acquirer return. However, these
two sub-hypotheses cannot be accepted fully as the support shown in the test results is not
statistically significant.
Table 13 summarizes the test results of the hypotheses. It is to be noted that results are based
on the cumulative abnormal return from 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1) unless otherwise
clarified.
Table 13 Results summary.
This table summarized the results of the hypotheses tested in this thesis. Results are based on
cumulative abnormal return from 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1) unless otherwise clarified.
Hypotheses Statements Results Explanations
H.1
Emerging market acquirers
enjoy positive abnormal returns
when the target company is
from an advanced economy.
Accepted
H.2
Emerging market acquirers enjoy
positive abnormal returns if there is
no government ownership involved.
Accepted
H.3
Emerging market acquirers
enjoy positive abnormal
returns from non-natural
resources related acquisitions.
Mixed
Accepted at full sample and subsample
level analysis for 3-day event
window CAR(–1, +1), but rejected
at full sample level analysis for
7-day and 11-day event windows
CAR(–3, +3) and CAR(–5, +5).
H.4a Economic distance is positively
related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
Rejected
H.4b Institutional distance is positively
related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
Supported The hypothesis is supported, however,
there is no statistical significance.
H.4c Cultural distance is negatively
related to acquirer’s abnormal return.
Rejected
H.4d Relative deal size is a positive
predictor of acquirer’s abnormal return.
Accepted
H.4e Private target status positively
influences acquirer’s abnormal return.
Supported The hypothesis is supported, however,
there is no statistical significance.
The results of this study are not without limitations. First of all, the country selection of
Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are not evenly distributed among the sample.
Looking at the sample data description (Figure 1 and Figure 3), it is obvious that cross-border
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acquisition deals are dominated by Indian acquirers in both the full sample and the subsample,
especially prior to year 2008. From year 2009 onwards, the number of deals originated from
China started to grow at a fast speed. Overall, deals by Indian and Chinese acquirers make up
the majority of the sample data, which means there can be a bias in the results towards those
two countries, especially India. Another limitation to note is the country specific characters in
play. The five selected countries represent markets of vast geographical and cultural differences,
while such selection ensures a good level of diversity of the sample, it also poses the challenge
of contradictory characteristics. A country level comparison study is therefore suggested for
future studies.
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6. Conclusion
Since the fifth merger wave, the world has seen a sharp increase in cross-border acquisitions
(Hitt et al., 2001). While the developed market acquirers started the trend, the emerging market
acquirers have been catching up at a fast speed. Since the early 2000s, both the number of
deals and the deal values by emerging market acquirers have experienced significant growth. A
common question being asked is whether these cross-border acquisitions benefit the acquirer in
terms of company value.
There have been extensive academic studies on the acquirer return at the acquisition
announcement by emerging market acquirers, with varying results. Majority of the studies
concentrate on one single market. Such as the ones conducted by Gubbi et al. (2010) and Ning
et al. (2014). Gubbi et al. (2010) study 425 cross-border acquisitions conducted by Indian
companies from 2000 to 2007 and find significant positive abnormal returns. Ning et al. (2014)
use 335 deals by Hong Kong Stock Exchange listed Chinese acquirers between 1991 and 2010
and show positive stock price reaction on average. There are few articles that provide a wider
view of emerging markets. Aybar and Ficici (2009) examine 433 cross-border deals mainly from
Asian countries between 1991 and 2004, and show value destruction in over half of the sample.
Bhagat et al. (2011) test 698 acquisitions made by emerging market companies between 1991
and 2008 and find significant positive market response on the announcement day. Although
overall there is a lack of evidence from multi-country data.
This thesis studies sample data from five major emerging markets: Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries), in order to shed some light into the study
of acquirer return in the overall emerging market environment. The data covers cross-border
acquisitions during the time period from January 1, 1995 to December 31, 2014. Acquisition
related data is retrieved from Thomson Financial Securities Data Company (SDC) and Thomson
One systems. Using publicly listed acquiring company, sufficient stock price data, and single
acquisition announcement by the same acquirer during the event window as the criteria, a full
sample of 958 deals is obtained. The event study methodology and cross-sectional regression
analysis are used in the empirical tests to answer a list of research questions regarding the
parameters and predictors that can influence the acquirer return. The event study is carried
out using cumulative abnormal returns from three sets of event windows: 3-day event window
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CAR(–1, +1), 7-day event window CAR(–3, +3), and 11-day event window CAR(–5, +5). For
the cross-sectional regression analysis, a total of 14 variables are introduced, which lead to a
reduced subsample of 535 deals.
The event study results shows that, emerging market acquirers enjoys significant positive
returns during 3-day event window when the target companies are from developed markets.
This result is consistent with the findings from Gubbi et al. (2010). Additionally, emerging
market acquirers experience significant positive returns during 3-day event window when the
acquirers themselves don’t have government ownership involvement, which is in line with the
results from Chen and Young (2010). Prior studies also suggest that there is a strong presence of
government ownership in natural resources related industries (Deng and Yang, 2015), thus, it is
expected that acquirers of non natural resources related deals benefit from positive return. When
comparing acquirer returns using natural resources related acquisition as a parameter however,
mixed results are observed: emerging market acquirers of non natural resources related deals
enjoy significant positive returns from 3-day event window (observed from both full sample and
subsample), while acquirers of natural resources related deals enjoy significant positive returns
from 7-day and 11-day event windows (observed from only full sample). There is a lack of
similar finding from prior studies, except that an earlier study by Nicholson and Salaber (2013)
show that Chinese manufacturing companies benefit from positive returns when announcing
natural resources related acquisitions. Government ownership and natural resources relatedness
are two aspects that haven’t been studies much using multi-country data. The analysis in this
thesis definitely show some interesting results of these two items, especially considering the
mixed results from natural resources relatedness, which can be recommended for future studies.
Cross-sectional analysis is performed on the subsample of 535 cross-border acquisitions
with the introduction of the following different independent variables: industry relatedness,
acquirer’s level of ownership after acquisition, target’s private status, cash payment, acquirer’s
government ownership involvement, target’s government ownership involvement, acquirer age,
relative deal size, natural resources related deal, target country’s economic status, institutional
distance, economic distance, cultural distance. The dependent variable used is the cumulative
abnormal return from 3-day event window CAR(–1, +1). The results from cross-sectional
regression analysis show varying correlations between different variables and acquirer return,
however, only one of them has statistical significance: relative deal size. Obtained through
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calculating the ratio of the acquisition transaction value to the acquirer’s market capitalization,
relative deal size positively influences the acquirer return. This result is consistent with the
earlier study by Bhagat et al. (2011).
The results of this thesis suffer from certain limitations. These limitations are mainly caused
by the country selection. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa are five major emerging
markets, which provide a good level of diversity for this study. However, the distribution of
cross-border acquisitions are not even among the five selected countries, India has the highest
number of cross-border acquisitions among all five countries, that is, the data from India will
have the highest impact towards the final result. In addition, country diversity means that
there are country specific characteristics which can affect the results. A comparative study
can be suggested as a possible solution to overcome these limitations. However, due to the
lack of sample data from a few countries, it is not possible to carry out a comprehensive
comparative study in this thesis, though a high level comparison is performed and results shown
in Appendices. Based on the comparison results, it can be observed that some variables have
varying level of influence and can have contradictory effects on deals from different countries,
which means that the overall multi-country analysis results can be biased. Therefore, further
studies can be suggested in the form of comparative study.
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Appendices
Appendix A List of developed countries / regions.
This list of developed countries / regions is used as the basis of defining target country’s
economic status in this thesis. This list is obtained based on IMF’s definition of developed
countries and regions.
Australia France Latvia Slovakia
Austria Germany Luxembourg Slovenia
Belgium Greece Malta South Korea
Canada Hong Kong Netherlands Spain
Cyprus Iceland New Zealand Sweden
Czech Republic Ireland Norway Switzerland
Denmark Israel Portugal Taiwan
Estonia Italy San Marino United Kingdom
Finland Japan Singapore United States
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Appendix B Cumulative abnormal return by acquirer country, full sample.
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return of full sample, N = 958, by acquirer country,
during announcement period of cross-border acquisitions by emerging market companies.
CAR (–5, +5), CAR (–3, +3), CAR (–1, +1) are the cumulative abnormal returns of the
corresponding event windows. Std dev. is the standard deviation. Natural resource related
industry refers to either Mining industry or Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining industry.
Cumulative abnormal returns are presented in percentages. * Cumulative abnormal return is
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). ** Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.05
level (2-tailed). *** Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Event window Mean Median Std dev. positive : negative t test
Brazil, N = 65
CAR (–5, +5) 0.23% -0.14% 0.0618 32 : 33 0.301
CAR (–3, +3) 0.6% 0.28% 0.0477 34 : 31 1.006
CAR (–1, +1) -0.02% -0.07% 0.033 28 : 37 -0.037
Russia, N = 110
CAR (–5, +5) -1.17% -0.74% 0.1094 48 : 62 -1.123
CAR (–3, +3) -0.52% -0.37% 0.077 51 : 59 -0.714
CAR (–1, +1) -0.06% -0.44% 0.0563 47 : 63 -0.113
India, N = 493
CAR (–5, +5) -0.48% -0.51% 0.1934 236 : 257 -0.547
CAR (–3, +3) 0.34% -0.46% 0.1336 231 : 262 0.571
CAR (–1, +1) 0.94% 0.36% 0.0706 271 : 222 2.944***
China, N = 135
CAR (–5, +5) 1.01% -0.88% 0.0831 63 : 72 1.418
CAR (–3, +3) 1.17% 0.56% 0.0684 79 : 56 1.98**
CAR (–1, +1) 0.71% 0.23% 0.0457 75 : 60 1.817*
South Africa, N = 155
CAR (–5, +5) 0.64% 0.08% 0.0823 79 : 76 0.962
CAR (–3, +3) 0.65% 0.53% 0.0764 87 : 68 1.053
CAR (–1, +1) 0.63% 0.01% 0.0546 78 : 77 1.429
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Appendix C Cumulative abnormal return by acquirer country, subsample.
This table shows the cumulative abnormal return of subsample, N = 535, that is used in the
cross-sectional regression analysis, by acquirer country, during announcement period of
cross-border acquisitions by emerging market companies. CAR (–5, +5), CAR (–3, +3), CAR
(–1, +1) are the cumulative abnormal returns of the corresponding event windows. Std dev. is
the standard deviation. Natural resource related industry refers to either Mining industry or Oil
and Gas; Petroleum Refining industry. Cumulative abnormal returns are presented in
percentages. * Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). **
Cumulative abnormal return is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). *** Cumulative
abnormal return is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Event window Mean Median Std dev. positive : negative t test
Brazil, N = 41
CAR (–5, +5) 0.81% 0.16% 0.0546 21 : 20 0.947
CAR (–3, +3) 0.62% -0.22% 0.0446 20 : 21 0.885
CAR (–1, +1) -0.16% -0.15% 0.0314 17 : 24 -0.318
Russia, N = 39
CAR (–5, +5) -1.57% -1.34% 0.138 13 : 26 -0.711
CAR (–3, +3) -0.73% -0.95% 0.0718 17 : 22 -0.636
CAR (–1, +1) 0.14% -0.4% 0.0785 16 : 23 0.113
India, N = 254
CAR (–5, +5) -1.47% -0.7% 0.2561 115 : 139 -0.916
CAR (–3, +3) -0.3% -0.66% 0.1722 115 : 139 -0.275
CAR (–1, +1) 0.81% 0.4% 0.0858 142 : 112 1.495
China, N = 96
CAR (–5, +5) 1.89% -0.05% 0.0923 48 : 48 2.006**
CAR (–3, +3) 1.66% 0.63% 0.077 56 : 40 2.112**
CAR (–1, +1) 0.86% 0.19% 0.0506 51 : 45 1.658
South Africa, N = 105
CAR (–5, +5) 1.34% 0.84% 0.0712 61 : 44 1.931*
CAR (–3, +3) 1.59% 1.14% 0.0833 67 : 38 1.951*
CAR (–1, +1) 0.79% 0.01% 0.0603 53 : 52 1.338
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Appendix D Results of cross-sectional regression, Brazil.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN -0.0096
(-0.619)
TECOSTATUS -0.0025
(-0.193)
INSTDIST 0.0114
(0.809)
ECODIST 0,0000
(-0.123)
CULDIST -0.0001
(-0.424)
(Constant) -0.0063 -0.012 -0.0062 -0.0111 -0.0056 -0.0134
(-0.281) (-0.488) (-0.272) (-0.475) (-0.239) (-0.498)
INDUSTRY -0.0079 -0.0046 -0.0069 -0.0112 -0.0079 0.0009
(-0.569) (-0.312) (-0.464) (-0.771) (-0.565) (0.061)
OWNERSHIP -0.0146 -0.0134 -0.0148 -0.0135 -0.0148 -0.0148
(-1.234) (-1.107) (-1.226) (-1.122) (-1.22) (-1.166)
TSTATUS 0.0153 0.0133 0.0149 0.0152 0.0154 0.0123
(1.172) (0.983) (1.106) (1.162) (1.16) (0.874)
CASHPMNT -0.0196 -0.0195 -0.0177 -0.0228 -0.0184 -0.0103
(-1.22) (-1.207) (-0.929) (-1.373) (-0.977) (-0.539)
TGOVN 0.0169 0.022 0.0185 0.0148 0.0182 0.0229
(0.507) (0.633) (0.53) (0.438) (0.513) (0.649)
ACQAGE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(-0.017) (0.194) (-0.005) (0.273) (-0.004) (0.104)
DEALSIZE -0.004 -0.0049 -0.004 -0.0031 -0.004 -0.0043
(-1.202) (-1.338) (-1.183) (-0.883) (-1.173) (-1.217)
NATRES 0.0005 -0.0015 0.001 0.0017 0.0002 0.0042
(0.031) (-0.095) (0.064) (0.113) (0.01) (0.266)
R2 0.148 0.158 0.149 0.165 0.148 0.163
N 41 41 41 41 41 37
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Appendix E Results of cross-sectional regression, China.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. * Regression coefficient is
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). ** Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed). *** Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN 0.012
(0.905)
TECOSTATUS 0.0121
(0.652)
INSTDIST -0.0021
(-0.07)
ECODIST 0,0000
(0.028)
CULDIST 0.0001
(0.363)
(Constant) -0.0025 -0.0062 -0.0159 -0.0004 -0.0029 -0.008
(-0.158) (-0.381) (-0.613) (-0.013) (-0.136) (-0.415)
INDUSTRY -0.0064 -0.006 -0.0048 -0.0064 -0.0063 -0.0041
(-0.61) (-0.571) (-0.449) (-0.61) (-0.593) (-0.384)
OWNERSHIP 0.0181* 0.0196* 0.0186* 0.0181* 0.0181* 0.02*
(1.719) (1.835) (1.754) (1.71) (1.703) (1.869)
TSTATUS 0.0162 0.0176 0.0161 0.0162 0.0162 0.0142
(1.32) (1.421) (1.306) (1.304) (1.313) (1.138)
CASHPMNT -0.0099 -0.0103 -0.0095 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0127
(-0.965) (-1.003) (-0.924) (-0.961) (-0.958) (-1.217)
TGOVN -0.0048 -0.0091 -0.001 -0.0051 -0.0047 0.0068
(-0.255) (-0.465) (-0.049) (-0.262) (-0.239) (0.341)
ACQAGE 0.0021*** 0.0022*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0021*** 0.0023***
(2.749) (2.854) (2.735) (2.731) (2.729) (2.937)
DEALSIZE 0.0059** 0.0061** 0.0057** 0.0059** 0.0059** 0.0063**
(2.143) (2.224) (2.048) (2.132) (2.131) (2.29)
NATRES 0.0115 0.0122 0.0114 0.0115 0.0115 0.0124
(0.845) (0.896) (0.838) (0.843) (0.841) (0.882)
R2 0.161 0.169 0.166 0.161 0.161 0.189
N 96 96 96 96 96 93
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Appendix F Results of cross-sectional regression, India.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. * Regression coefficient is
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN -0.0197
(-0.661)
TECOSTATUS 0.0099
(0.76)
INSTDIST 0.0135
(0.538)
ECODIST 0,0000
(0.602)
CULDIST 0.0007
(1.088)
(Constant) 0.0188 0.0202 0.0102 0.0058 0.0106 -0.0146
(0.924) (0.985) (0.437) (0.182) (0.431) (-0.347)
INDUSTRY -0.0102 -0.0092 -0.0099 -0.0099 -0.0095 -0.0101
(-0.919) (-0.828) (-0.895) (-0.895) (-0.855) (-0.84)
OWNERSHIP -0.0042 -0.0069 -0.0044 -0.0046 -0.004 -0.0062
(-0.258) (-0.413) (-0.272) (-0.283) (-0.247) (-0.327)
TSTATUS 0.0157 0.0157 0.0161 0.0159 0.016 0.0181
(1.407) (1.402) (1.439) (1.418) (1.425) (1.481)
CASHPMNT 0.0118 0.012 0.0114 0.0111 0.0115 0.0113
(1.005) (1.015) (0.962) (0.934) (0.976) (0.881)
TGOVN 0.0204 0.0239 0.0242 0.0226 0.0236 0.0278
(0.513) (0.595) (0.603) (0.564) (0.588) (0.602)
ACQAGE 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000 0,0000
(0.015) (0.083) (0.055) (0.072) (0.053) (-0.104)
DEALSIZE 0.0045* 0.0043 0.0043 0.0045 0.0043 0.0053*
(1.668) (1.577) (1.569) (1.649) (1.563) (1.724)
NATRES -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0023 -0.0019 -0.0017 -0.0012
(-0.125) (-0.138) (-0.144) (-0.119) (-0.107) (-0.068)
R2 0.027 0.028 0.029 0.028 0.028 0.034
N 254 254 254 254 254 234
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Appendix G Results of cross-sectional regression, Russia.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. * Regression coefficient is
significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed). ** Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.05 level
(2-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN -0.0141
(-0.454)
TECOSTATUS -0.0057
(-0.214)
INSTDIST 0.0166
(0.398)
ECODIST 0,0000
(0.131)
CULDIST 0,0000
(-0.033)
(Constant) 0.095* 0.0939* 0.1* 0.076 0.0936* 0.0205
(1.79) (1.742) (1.703) (1.054) (1.696) (0.398)
INDUSTRY 0.0251 0.0285 0.0246 0.0244 0.0247 -0.0162
(0.87) (0.944) (0.838) (0.833) (0.837) (-1.035)
OWNERSHIP -0.0123 -0.0137 -0.0129 -0.0108 -0.0119 0.0131
(-0.352) (-0.385) (-0.363) (-0.302) (-0.335) (0.814)
TSTATUS -0.0357 -0.0389 -0.0361 -0.0335 -0.0359 -0.0245
(-1.043) (-1.098) (-1.035) (-0.953) (-1.031) (-1.234)
CASHPMNT 0.0041 0.0053 0.0028 0.011 0.0047 -0.0194
(0.125) (0.161) (0.083) (0.296) (0.14) (-1.084)
TGOVN -0.0084 -0.0048 -0.0083 -0.0004 -0.0081 -0.0036
(-0.234) (-0.129) (-0.228) (-0.011) (-0.221) (-0.154)
ACQAGE -0.0104** -0.0103** -0.0105** -0.01** -0.0102** 0.0001
(-2.231) (-2.176) (-2.203) (-2.074) (-2.126) (0.038)
DEALSIZE 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0008 0.001 0.0008 0.0029
(0.099) (-0.02) (0.109) (0.125) (0.108) (0.837)
NATRES -0.0234 -0.022 -0.0228 -0.0261 -0.0245 0.0071
(-0.693) (-0.639) (-0.662) (-0.747) (-0.693) (0.5)
R2 0.221 0.227 0.222 0.225 0.222 0.254
N 39 39 39 39 39 22
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Appendix H Results of cross-sectional regression, South Africa.
Cumulative abnormal return during 3 day event window, CAR(–1, +1), is the dependent
variable in all models. Coefficients and t values are presented in the table, with t values given
in parentheses. INDUSTRY: industry relatedness; OWNERSHIP: acquirer’s level of
ownership after acquisition; TSTATUS: target’s private status; CASHPMNT: cash payment;
AGOVN: acquirer’s government ownership involvement; TGOVN: target’s government
ownership involvement; ACQAGE: acquirer age; DEALSIZE: natural logarithm of ratio of
transaction value to acquirer’s market capitablization; NATRES: natural resources related
industry; TECOSTATUS: target country’s economic status; INSTDIST: institutional distance;
ECODIST: economic distance; CULDIST: cultural distance. TGOVN variable is zero in South
Africa related sample. * Regression coefficient is significant at the 0.10 level (2-tailed).
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
AGOVN -0.0111
(-0.177)
TECOSTATUS 0.0074
(0.501)
INSTDIST 0.0089
(0.607)
ECODIST 0,0000
(0.131)
CULDIST -0.0005
(-0.85)
(Constant) 0.0275 0.0279 0.0217 0.021 0.0262 0.0445
(1.094) (1.099) (0.779) (0.767) (0.957) (1.162)
INDUSTRY 0.0046 0.0048 0.0054 0.0046 0.0047 0.0063
(0.375) (0.386) (0.436) (0.372) (0.385) (0.445)
OWNERSHIP -0.0294* -0.0293* -0.0311* -0.031* -0.0298* -0.0355*
(-1.851) (-1.834) (-1.908) (-1.921) (-1.834) (-1.876)
TSTATUS 0.0105 0.0103 0.0104 0.0101 0.0108 0.0141
(0.817) (0.787) (0.807) (0.779) (0.824) (0.897)
CASHPMNT 0.0009 0.0006 0.0024 0.0021 0.0013 0.003
(0.068) (0.046) (0.177) (0.157) (0.095) (0.196)
TGOVN
ACQAGE 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001
(0.566) (0.565) (0.589) (0.6) (0.557) (0.525)
DEALSIZE 0.0018 0.0018 0.0016 0.0016 0.0017 0.0008
(0.513) (0.525) (0.464) (0.464) (0.485) (0.163)
NATRES -0.0119 -0.0121 -0.0126 -0.0128 -0.0119 -0.0195
(-0.731) (-0.735) (-0.768) (-0.778) (-0.727) (-1.017)
R2 0.051 0.051 0.053 0.054 0.051 0.068
N 105 105 105 105 105 89
